# THE STATE OF THE NATION

For the YEAR 1747,

AND

RESPECTING 1748.

Inſcribed to a MEMBER of the preſent PARLIAMENT.

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*Pro Libertate, Vitæ periculo decernendum eſt. Non enim in Spiritu Vita eſt, ſed ea nulla eſt omnino Servienti.*

HANC *igitur occaſionem oblatam tenete per Deos immortales P.C. & ampliſſimo orbis terræ conſilii Principes vos eſſe aliquando recordamini.*

TULL. Orat.

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The SECOND EDITION.

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# INTRODUCTION.

BEFORE the State of the Nation is entered upon for the current Year, it may be extremely neceſſary to form a brief Recapitulation of what we remarked under the ſame Title the laſt Year; not only as it will have a natural Connection with the enſuing, but will at the ſame Time evince the Impartiality of our Views, the Veracity of our Aſſertions, and the Effect of our Conjectures.

In the Preface thereto were inſerted Facts, which demonſtrated the vaſt Difference between the Expences for like Services, during Queen *Anne*'s, and the preſent War; and that if the Revenues had been equally well huſbanded now, as then, that we had been 8,000,000 leſs in Debt. And for the Truth whereof the ſaid Preface is hereby referred to.

It was then remarked, that all our Diſappointments, and the Evils naturally reſulting therefrom, were entirely owing to the injudicious Choice of Perſons employed in the Public Service; and the Difficulties we muſt be naturally driven to, if our Plan of Conduct was not altered. *P.* 3, 4.

It was next ſhewn, that it was not the Expence of the War, but the Application of the Money, that we diſputed about. Agreeing it had been better to have raiſed double the Sum, ſo the War had been warmly purſued, and the *French* Trade ruined: But inſtead of ſo acting, we fell into a Lethargy, and an infamous Fawning on the *French* for Peace. *To P.* 5.

We then entered into a Diſcuſſion of the Queſtion, Who were the greateſt Enemies of the State, thoſe who wrote againſt ſuch Conduct, or thoſe who purſued it? And proved it on the laſt. *To P.* 6.

We then ſhewed what Money would be wanted for the Service of the current Year; which

which ſtands there computed at 10,363,352 Pounds, and which will be found to vary little from the Truth, when what was ordered to be raiſed, and what Debts have been contracted, on Account of the current Service of the Year, are thrown together. And from thence concluded, that if the ſame Courſe was longer purſued, the Intereſt of our Debts would riſe ſo high, that 7,000,000 would not ſerve the anual Exigencies of a dead Peace; and therefore propoſed, in particular, an accurate Inſpection into the Application of the Civil-Liſt Revenue, *To P.* 10.

The Pretence of Miniſters, who force themſelves into Power, was next conſidered, who found Affairs in a fine Train of Succeſs, but, by their ill Conduct, threw them into Confuſion. The Benefit of the Treaty of *Wormes* was evidenced, and the State and Nature of our own and the *French* Naval Power were compared and adjuſted; with Calculations ſuitably adapted, with Remarks on our Navy Debt, and in what Manner accumulating. Upon the whole evidencing, that the *French* better protected their Commerce, at the Dif-

ference of 2,456,000 *l.* Balance againſt us, and all this ſhewn by ſpecial Inſtances and Illuſtrations. *To P.* 19.

It was next attempted to ſhew the Neceſſity of abſolutely deſtroying the *French* Commerce, becauſe, as is evident to the Senſe and Reaſon of all Mankind, it is what ſupports their Armies; and gave our Thoughts very freely in what Manner it was to be effected. We then recited that idle Expedition to *Port l'Orient*; ſhewed the Folly of purſuing it, at the Time, and in the Manner, it was attempted; and what better Account our Naval Military might have been turned to; and proved the Error of that Expedition, by ſhewing that it did not ſucceed, though neither oppoſed by the Enemy, nor by any Misfortune whatſoever. That it did no Good every Body agreed, but that it ſenſibly injured us we proved, and concluded, that it was a fine Enterprize miſerably murdered; and conſequently, that our Miniſters Heads were not ſuited to ſuch Matters. And thence it became an Enquiry what they were ſuited to; not to the Management of Revenues, was plainly ſhewn, as it was,

that

that the private Intereſt of a few Men, overbalanced all Regard to the Honour, Welfare, and Proſperity of the State. *To P.* 32.

We then called upon the noble Perſon addreſſed to, in our own Name, and in that of the Nation, to conſider the natural Conſequence of all this in Time, and intimated to him the ruinous Effects of a Peace in ſuch a Situation, eſpecially as it was ſhewn, that the *French* Aids were leſſened 224,000 Men ſince the Commencement of the War, which made a very conſiderable Alteration in the State of the War, and the Enemy's Reſource very far from the common Eſtimation; as they had loſt ſeveral of their beſt Trades, therein ennumerated, and had only remaining the *Weſt-India* Iſland and *Miſſiſſipi*, which we propoſed the coming Summer might, with good Conduct, have been quite annihilated, and propoſed the Means to that End, very contrary to the Meaſures previouſly purſued. *To P.* 49.

We then entered upon the State of *Europe* in general; that our Revenues were at leaſt as good as thoſe of *France*, and our Alliances pretty

pretty equally balanced; our Navy equal to all *Europe*; and that *France* muſt ſoon ſink under the Weight of the War; and conſequently, that we were in a fair Way, by purſuing the War with Vigour, to end it by a glorious and ſucceſsful Peace. And annexed thereto, by Way of Appendix, the *French* King's well-concerted Regulations of Convoys for the Iſlands belonging to that Crown in *America*, dated *May* 14. 1745; which was intended for, and did effectually ſhew our Negligence or Ignorance in ſimilar Caſes.

The

# The STATE of THE NATIONAL DEBT.

| | | l. |
|---|---|---|
| THE National Debt 1744, being the first Year of the War with *France* and *Spain*, | | 53,679,248 |
| Navy Debt the same Year, | | 3,288,441 |
| | | 56,967,689 |
| The National Debt 1740, | 45,943,946 | |
| Navy Debt, | 1,301,525 | 47,245,471 |
| | 47,245,471 | |
| | | 9,722,218 |

In

| | |
|---|---|
| In the Year 1747, one Million of the Navy Debt was paid off, and on the 30th of *September*, 1747, it was, | 4,628,070 |
| Wherefrom deduct the above Sum of | 3,288,441 |
| Remains, | 1,339,629 |
| To which add one Million paid off, | 1,000,000 |
| Debt accrued between *December*, 1744, and *September* 31, 1747, | 2,339,629 |
| Which, had the three Years been complete, would have amounted to but each Year, | 779,876 |
| To which add the annual Allowance, | 2,080000 |
| Total of the annual Expence of the Navy in Commiſſion, | 2,859,876 |
| To the Ordinary of the Navy, | 200,000 |
| Total Naval Expence, | 3,059,876 |

The Money raiſed for the annual Service for the firſt four Years of the War with *Spain*, 1740, to 1743 incluſive, and for the four Years War with *France* and *Spain*, 1744,

to 1747 inclusive; with the Increase of the National Debt during that Time, and the Amount of the National and Navy Debt to the 30th of *September*, 1747.

| | National Debt. | Navy Debt. | Total. |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1740—4,059,722 | 45,943,946 | 1,301,525 | 47,245,471 |
| 1741—4,501,022 | | | |
| 1742—6,150,000 | Increased, | | 9,722,218 |
| 1743—6,562,492 | | | |
| 1744—6,203,562 | 53,679,248 | 3,288,441 | 56,967,689 |
| 1745—6,462,901 | 12,298,657 | 1,339,629 | 13,638,286 |
| 1746—7,063,251 | | | |
| 1747—9,425,253 | 65,977,905 | 4,628,070 | 70,605,975 |

Thus it appears, that the National Debt, *September* 30, 1747, is, 65,977,905
The Navy Debt, 4,628,070

Total, 70,605,975

This Calculation is founded on the known increased Debt, the first five Years of 9,722,218, whereby, and by the Sums raised each Year it appears, that all the Money above 3,550,916, supplied Annually out of the Land, Malt Tax, and Sinking-fund, are Debts; the Interest whereof, at four *per Cent.* excluding the last Quarter to *Christmas*, is 2,824,239 Pounds.

It

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|---|---|
| It appears above, that our annual Supplies, independent of Funds to pay Intereſt, is, | 3,550,916 |
| The Intereſt of our Debts, | 2,824,239 |
| Difference, | 626,677 |

Thus it appears, that the Difference between our clear Supplies, and the Intereſt of our Debts, is but 626,677 Pounds. So that if there was a Peace, and the Land-Tax reduced to two Shillings in the Pound, or 1,000,000 leſs than now, the Revenue would be leſs than the Intereſt of the Debt, and conſequently no Surpluſage out of the eſtabliſhed Funds to pay them off.

The Inference I would draw herefrom is, that we muſt either find Means to redeem our Debts, by Acquiſitions from the *French*, or otherwiſe continue as much involved in Taxes, when a Peace is made, as in War, though perhaps not equally increaſe our Debts.

To prove this from indiſputable Fact, I only deſire it may be conſidered, whether if between the Peace of *Utrecht* and the Year 1740, very little or any of the Public Debts were paid off, though then but 50,000,000, I ſpeak in the Groſs, how much leſs can it be preſumed, that

any will be paid off, ſuppoſe a Peace made this following Year, 1748, when the Debt will be near 80,000,000? So that, in Truth, we are fighting now for our Preſervation, of which we ſhall ſpeak more in it's proper Place. It remains only to ſhew the Difference between the Sums raiſed in the firſt four Years of Queen *Ann*'s War with *France* and *Spain*, and thoſe raiſed the four Years of the preſent War with the ſame; eſteeming the previous four Years War with *Spain* only, as no Kind of Parallel. For the laſt four Years ſome Allowance muſt be made, as the Debts are higher, but that is near balanced by the Sinking-fund; and the Cauſe of the real Difference was fully ſhewn, by balancing a few Articles in the State of the Nation for the laſt Year. I will not ſay any Thing of the Duke of *Marlborough*'s Succeſs; but muſt remark, that he was always near equal to the Enemy in Point of Numbers, which we but too well know has not been the Caſe lately, though more Money paid than at that Time; beſides that the *Queen* had an Army in *Spain*. As an Ally we have only loſt *Pruſſia*, but then the *French* have not *Bavaria*; it may then be agreed, that the general State of Things is pretty equal. The different Sums expended, beſt ſeen by the following Tables.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1744 | 6,203,562—1702 | 3,000,000 | |
| 1745 | 6,462,901—1703 | 3,694,136 | |
| 1746 | 7,063,251—1704 | 3,828,886 | |
| 1747 | 9,425,253—1705 | 4,670,486 | |
| | 29,154,967 | 15,193,508 | Difference: 13,961,459 |

This is, upon an Average, 3,490,364 a Year, and the Charge of Queen *Anne*'s War, on the ſame Average, but 3,798,377; ſo that the Difference between the Surplus in this War, and the whole Expence of Queen *Anne*'s, is but 308,013. The Allowance for the Navy was the ſame then as now, and the contracted Debts thereupon ſomewhat allied. If we pay more Subſidies, or employ more Troops, then ought the End to be better anſwered, and we appear in the Field nearer on an Equality with the Enemy; but if that be not the Caſe, wherein conſiſts the vaſt Difference of Expence aggregating Annually, and forcing ourſelves into a bad Peace, and, from the Day of it's being concluded, eſtabliſhing us in Debt and Beggary?

The

# The STATE of THE NATION.

I HAVE a double Pleaſure in entering upon the State of the Nation now, as it appears by the Recapitulation premiſed, that I was right in every Conjecture, and in that I have a moſt pleaſing Proſpect before me of ſeeing the Honour of my Country recovering, and our happy Conſtitution eſtabliſhed on a durable Baſis.

The Way to give Health and Vigour to the State, is the ſame, as to Cure malignant Diſorders in the human Body, that is to ſay, by Sudorifics and Perſpiration: The Illneſs thus driven off, ſound Health returns, and the Patient flouriſhes again in full Bloom. In this Manner I propoſe to treat the Body Politic annually, until all its groſs Humours evaporate.

The Reader will readily perceive that I am here talking in Metaphor, and that I mean by the Nation thoſe who take upon themſelves to govern it, independent of the Legal Eſtabliſhment, in Conſequence of a Kind of Self-Creation, which at once gave them Being, and conſtituted them a M——y. Theſe are the Men, from whom I propoſe to ſweat off all Errors and Malignancy, and by reſtoring them to a right State of Judgment give them Honour, and the Nation a well conſidered Peace.

The firſt Subject I ſhall enter upon, in Purſuance of this great End, is the State of the Navy, which we left laſt Year *doing* of *nothing*, yet vaſtly accumulating its Debts. The principal Uſe of a Navy, is the Protection of our Commerce, and the ruining of that of the Enemy's. By protecting of our Commerce, the Navy is ſupported; and by deſtroying that of the Enemy, our Own is neceſſarily improved, more eſpecially in ſuch Branches wherein we are more particularly Competitors, as in the Peltry or Fur Trade, in the Fiſhery, and in Sugars: As the Enemy's Intereſt in theſe Particulars decline, their Markets become ours, which will not only raiſe the Value of each diſtinct Commodity, but improve in a very ſingular Degree our Shipping and Seamen, in Conſequence thereof the Growth of our *American* Colonies, and our Home Products and Manufactures; at the ſame Time that it leſſens that of the Enemy, and at once lowers their Naval Power, and diſſipates the Funds conſtituted to ſupport their Armies. And though we are not their ſole Competitors in the *Eaſt-India* Trade, yet the Deſtruction thereof will divide the eventual Market between us and the *Dutch*, and contribute eſſentially to the Ruin of their Naval Power, the great End aimed at by this War, and whereby only we can be indemnified our Expences. The next is their *Levant* Trade, wherein we are perhaps more materially concerned, as a great Quantity of our Woollen Goods, of the beſt Kinds, are there vended. And laſtly, the *Eaſt* Country Trade, which the *French* can have no Occaſion for, when the others are annihilated.

This premiſed leads us into conſidering the Nature and Neceſſity of ſo conducting our Naval Affairs, as that the *French* Commerce as aboveſaid may be effectually deſtroyed.

The *Britiſh* Navy is now in ſo happy a State, that we can always afford to have at Sea one hundred and fifty

fifty Sail of Men of War, from ſeventy Guns downwards, while the *French* cannot any Way have above thirty at Sea on the ſame Average, and thoſe fitting out of different and diſtant Ports, and therefore not readily drawn together. There being not now in *France*, by the beſt Accounts, above twenty Ships of the Line in all the Ports, and ſome of them quite unfit for Service. And it is no little Satisfaction to find that we have Officers in the Navy, both willing and capable to do their Duty, ſo that we are plainly in a Condition to ruin the *French* Trade: How it is to be done ſhall be mentioned hereafter, but what has been done, is at preſent under our firſt Conſideration.

One of the principal Objects of the preſent War, in Conſequence of the Treaty of *Wormes*, was to drive the *French* and *Spaniards* out of *Italy*. As this materially depended on the Conduct of the great Fleet we kept in the *Mediterranean* for that Purpoſe, it was neceſſary that the Ships ſhould be ſo ſtationed, as that the Enemy might have no Supplies by Sea; but how that has been attended to, muſt appear by what has been done. It is notorious, that the *French* have from Time to Time landed large Bodies of Forces at *Genoa*, and that vaſt Numbers of ſmall Veſſels have continually ſupplied that City with Stores and Proviſions, while we kept a Fleet there ſuperior to all the Force of *France* and *Spain* together: A Fleet chiefly compoſed of large Ships, ſome of them containing Men enough to have manned twenty Veſſels, more fit for the Service in View, as thoſe, wherewith the Enemy were ſupplied, uſually were ſmall and kept ſo near the Shore; or ſeparated into ſmall Diviſions, purſued their reſpective Courſes ſo many different Ways, and had always ſo ſhort a Run to get in with the Land, on being chaced, that where one was taken, twenty muſt eſcape, ſuppoſing our great Ships really well ſtationed, and their Commanders active and attentive, which I con-

ceive will appear not to have been the Caſe. Here it is to be obſerved, that if the Enemy ſaved one Supply-ſhip or Veſſel out of three, the main End of their ſending them was ſufficiently anſwered; as it could only make Proviſions one Penny in three dearer; and as to Soldiers and Stores, it was only ſending one Third more than was neceſſary, and their Buſineſs was done, with ſimply the Difference of one Third more Expence, which being ſo calculated, and conſequentially proſecuted, made no Kind of Difference in the Effect. But on the contrary, all that were ſaved, on the Preſumption of ſuch Riſque, clear Benefit. And as that has been the Caſe, and that inſtead of loſing one out of three, they have not loſt one out of twenty, *Genoa* is conſiderably better ſupplied than it would have been if the Sea had been left quite open, which is very far from anſwering the intended Purpoſe. Now as a convincing Proof, that our Fleet has not been duly ſtationed this laſt Summer, we need only obſerve, that the ſame Stations, generally ſpeaking, which might prevent the *French* or *Neapolitans* from ſupplying *Genoa*, muſt have intercepted the *French Levant* Trade, which, as we find not to have been done, we may conclude without farther Enquiry, that *Port-Mahon* Harbour has been more generally the Rendevouz of our Fleet, than that they have been diſpoſed on cruizing Stations. And conſequently have been of as little Service to the Allies, as to the Deſtruction of the *French* Commerce. And thus anſwering neither one End nor the other, might full as well have been at Home and out of Commiſſion. As a Proof of the Juſtneſs of this Reflection, I find, that a Perſon of great Dignity in the State inſiſted ſome Time ſince on the nine great Ships being recalled from the *Mediterranean*, as they appeared to be uſeleſs there; which the L—ds of the A———y were ordered to direct accordingly.

I ſhall

I ſhall next turn my Thoughts on our Naval Conduct in Relation to the *Eaſt-Indies*. The State of our Affairs there was very well underſtood, the Number, Force, and Power of the *French* Armament, by more Channels than one, as I am able to prove, was known to be much ſuperior to that under Commodore *Barnet*, and that the Enemy were meditating an Attack upon, and the Deſtruction of all our Settlements in that Part of the World, which was in ſome Meaſure effected by the taking of *Madraſs*, and muſt have neceſſarily followed as to the reſidue, if a providential Storm had not done more in our Favour, than our Wiſdom or Foreſight ſeemed capable of. And was as much the Preſervation of our remaining *India* Settlements, as another was of ſaving *North-America* the ſame Year; a Circumſtance we all but too well remember, and in both Caſes are more obliged to the immediate Hand, and indulgent Care of Providence, that Mr. *de Bourdenay* ſucceeded no better in the *Eaſt*, nor *d'Anville* no better in the *Weſt*. Yet am I perſuaded, on a fair Calculation, that the *India* Company had much better have paid the Expence of an additional Squadron, or our Navy Conductors increaſed the Publick Debt half a Million, than have ſuffered *Madraſs* to be taken, not only as to what was loſt there, but likewiſe as to the Diſhonour, ſo important a Loſs muſt neceſſarily bring on a trading Nation, valuing itſelf on its maritime Strength and Power. A Diſhonour not preſently eradicated out of the Minds of the *Indians*, nor eaſily blotted out of the *European* Annals. A Diſhonour that will be a Stain upon us to future Ages, and ſtamp a Mark of Infamy on our M———l Conduct.

What ſome People were aiming at, in this melancholly Criſis, is not very difficult to gueſs. *A Peace*, the moſt wicked, that, conſidering the Nature, Reaſon, and Circumſtances of Things, ever entered into the Heads or Hearts of Men. *A Peace*, that muſt

have reduced us to little better than a Province of *France*, and made us Slaves to her ambitious Dictates. *A Peace*, wherein muſt have been buried all our ancient Honour, reduced the illuſtrious Houſe of *Hanover* to a Subſtitution and Dependence on that of *Bourbon*, and brought on with it ſuch a Train of Miſeries, as are not readily to be recounted. There needs nothing to prove the Intention, but the Nature of the Act, otherwiſe it might have been an Excuſe, that our Ships had been wanted at Home; but it was evidently no ſuch Thing, our Ships lay abſolutely idle, that is to ſay, many of them at *Spithead*, and nothing done to annoy the Enemy, or pierce him in the tendereſt Part, though the whole Coaſt of *France* quite open and unguarded. And what elſe but a *bad Peace* could all this tend to? a *good one* being only to be procured by beating the Enemy into right Terms: And a bad one, by letting the *French* take our *India* Settlements, and thoſe of *North-America*. So that had we taken the Iſland of *Belliſle*, intercepted their Convoys, or alarmed their Coaſts, we had ſpoiled their whole Scheme, and had a good Peace in ſpite of our Teeth. For it is to be obſerved, that had we taken *Belliſle*, the whole Courſe of the *French Weſtern* Commerce had been impeded, as we ſhould thereby have commanded all the Harbours on the Coaſt. And if we had fell on the Coaſt of *Spain*, where there are not ten Thouſand regular Troops in the whole Kingdom, it is poſſible that the *Spaniards* would have aſked for a Peace. And if we had only attacked their Works before *Gibraltar*, wherein there was not, nor perhaps is now above four Hundred Men; it is poſſible that we might have demoliſhed thoſe Works, and had the Bay at Liberty, for our Men of War and trading Ships to have rode in, which is now ſo far from being the Caſe, that they are either obliged to anchor in very deep Water, lie among the ground Rocks,

ſubject-

ſubjected to the Hurricanes from the Hill, equally bad Anchorage, or to go into the New Mole, a proper Receptacle but for few Ships, and ſo inconvenient for ſtationed Ships in Time of War, that the Enemy's Privateers carry their Prizes into their own Ports, on the other Side of the Bay, in Sight of them, without Remedy or Reſtraint. When we conſider all theſe Things, and that the Alarming of the Enemy's Coaſts muſt have drawn off their Armies from *Italy* and *Flanders*, we can be at no Loſs to gueſs why it has not been, or is not ſtill done; nor is it any other Way to be accounted for, but by the Hopes of making a bad Peace.

When we ſeriouſly conſider the fine Situation Providence has thrown us into, almoſt in Spite of ourſelves, a flouriſhing Navy, the People in high Spirits, and the Facility wherewith the *French* Commerce may be deſtroyed; and how nice and critical a Conjuncture preſents, on which our All depends, while Fortune ſeems hovering over us, holding out to us the Hand of Plenty and Power: What Kind of wrong-headed People muſt we be, to ſhut our Eyes againſt the glaring Light of Meridian Day, and voluntarily involve ourſelves in Darkneſs, Deſtruction and Diſhonour?

There is one Thing I conceive we ought now to puſh for, if nothing elſe could engage us, that is, the only Means in Nature of paying our Debts, by the Increaſe of the Revenues reſulting from the Acquiſition of the *French Weſt-India* and *North-American* Trade. This is ſo far from an Inducement to a Peace on any Terms, that I humbly think a good Politician would kindle up and cheriſh the Flames of War on the Continent, that we might have Time to bring this about. If a Thought of this Kind has any Thing immoral in it, I muſt beg the Reader to conſider firſt the State and Nature of Things; whether it is not more juſt to encourage a War that muſt certainly

ruin a determined Enemy, than a Peace which muſt ruin ourſelves. All Mankind muſt know that the *French* will never make a Peace while Victors on the Continent, without ſome obvious View of renewing the War again with Advantage, and conſequently on ſuch Terms as we cannot with Honour accept. On a like Footing with the War is the Trade. It is pretty near the Criſis that either the *French* or we muſt trade to no Purpoſe, and who in their Senſes would doubt about the Alternative? The *French* have the better by Land, let them go on. *Germany* is the ſure Grave of both their Wealth and Glory; our Buſineſs is to take Care to defend *Holland* as our own Frontier; and ſince we cannot beat them on Shore to make ourſelves and Allies Amends, by improving our Commerce on the Ruin of that of *France*, and thereby enabling ourſelves at once to find our Allies Money, who want nothing elſe to defend themſelves, and ſecure to the Nation that Wealth, by which only the *French* are able to trouble the Repoſe of *Europe*. This I think is no immoral View, on the contrary, Self-preſervation, and the Senſe and Reaſon of Things ſeems to command it. It is better to kill a Thief, before he fires his Piſtol at me, than to wait the Event, at the Hazard of my own Life and Property. Common Senſe indicates this to every intelligent Creature breathing, and the ſame Kind of Man who would ſtand patiently, and let a Thief rob and murder him, would make a Peace with the *French*, and quietly become their Slaves.

It is extremely neceſſary, on this Occaſion, to diſtinguiſh between the Situation of the Affairs of *Europe* in general, and what regards *Great Britain* in particular. As to Affairs in general, the *French* have the Advantage, particularly on the Side of the *Low-Countries*, where their Troops are more numerous, and their Generals more experienced. On the contrary,

trary, as it relates to ourſelves, our Maritime Strength is vaſtly ſuperior, and has opened a Proſpect before us of preſerving this Superiority for ever. It is ſurely good then, that we ſeize this auſpicious Conjuncture, and by a Spirit and Addreſs, becoming *Engliſhmen*, render ourſelves revered and dreaded; the happy Succeſs of the Admirals *Anſon*, *Warren* and *Hawke*, is an Earneſt of our future Glory, and ſo good a Beginning towards an Amendment in our Maritime Affairs, an evident Sign that we are in ſome Meaſure recovering our Senſes; and very happily too at a Time, when it is the univerſal Opinion of the Nation, that nothing can ſave us, but purſuing with Vigour our preſent Advantages as a Naval Power.

In the *Weſt-Indies*, it's true, we have neither had nor attempted Succeſs; the Officers ſent thither, one after another, have acted on Principles ſo very like each other, and ſo little Notice taken of their Proceedings, except by a Kind of fictitious Trials, before People as wicked as themſelves, that one is almoſt induced to believe, it was never intended they ſhould be puniſhed for either wilful Negligence or Cowardice, but rather, that they were ſupported by ſome ſecret Indications, that the worſe they behaved, and the more they ſacrificed the Commercial Intereſt, the better their Conduct would be approved. And this ſeems the more probable, ſince, notwithſtanding the juſt Complaints of the Merchants, the Aggreſſors have not, in any Senſe, felt the Weight of the Reſentment of an injured People.

If there was any Thing ſingular in the Behaviour of the Naval Officers in the *Weſt-Indies*, or did not others purſue the ſame bad Courſes in the *Eaſt-Indies*; or had our Affairs in either been duly attended to, the other might have well been paſſed over as the bad Acts of the Officers reſpectively; but when we ſee ſuch Conduct tacitly approved, it is naturally

naturally to be imagined, they are not alone blameleſs.

It is certain, to a Demonſtration, that it was known, Time enough to have been prevented, that the *French* were fitting out a Fleet under *de Bourdenaye*, which was intended to deſtroy our *Eaſt-India* Settlements, yet not the leaſt Care taken to prevent it. Our Squadron there was either ſtrong enough to prevent the Conſequences, or it was not. If it was ſtrong enough, as they met the *French* with their full Power, why did they not repel them? or, on Failure, why not the Aggreſſors puniſhed according to their Demerits? and if they were not ſtrong enough, why not reinforced? Thus take the Point which Way we will, there is certainly, on the Face of the Argument, very ſtrong Preſumptions of ſomething extremely wicked at the Bottom; and evidently owe, in the firſt Place, the Preſervation of our other Factories to a Providential Storm, and in the ſecond and third, to the ſeverally intercepting the farther Detachments of the *French* that Way.

And here I ſhall beg Leave to take Notice of a Maxim ever attended to with Solicitude, by wiſe and experienced Stateſmen, which is, That Commerce is ſupported (more particularly) in the *Eaſt-Indies*, by the Credit of the Power that ſeeks it; and that Credit ever acquired, by ſhewing, when Occaſion commands, our Naval Force and Superiority. This is what is termed, in other Words, the Honour and Reputation of a Nation, that carries with it a Weight and Influence not to be balanced by Money. There is a Kind of ſpecial Regard to Reputation, that runs through the minuteſt of our Purſuits up to the higheſt, and gives the Party honoured a Figure and Dignity, that Wealth has the leaſt Share in. It is the Sun that warms and influences, that firſt inſpires us with Pleaſure, next creates Admiration, and laſtly, makes either individual Perſons, or embodied Communities,

munities, reverenced and adored. This the *French* ſeemed to underſtand, by puſhing their main Strength that Way. Providence, ſucceeded by Accident, has fully defeated their Views, and I hope at once opened the Eyes of, and convinced our blind Leaders of an Error, that might, if avoided by a judicious Attention at firſt, have contributed eſſentially to the Ending of the War with Glory, and thereby, at leaſt, have ſaved us 10,000,000 of Money, and, inſtead of loſing *Madraſs*, put us in Poſſeſſion of all the *French* Factories in *India*.

In the *Weſt-Indies* we ſee the Caſe has been ſomewhat ſimilar, it not having been poſſible for the *French* to have carried on that Trade now with a ſingle Ship, if but a moderate Attention had been given to the main End of the War, for theſe two laſt Summers paſt; but as all this has happened in Conſequence of a very extraordinary Change in the Admiralty, previous whereto one Fourth of the whole *French Weſt-India* Men were captured in one Year; but at length other Meaſures took Place, and while we ſeemed wholly bent on having a Peace on any Terms, we ſtruck directly into the Road that carried us a quite contrary Courſe.

Here, as quite pertinent to the Subject, I muſt beg Leave to make ſome Remarks on the pernicious Conſequences of inſuring the Enemy's Ships, the unhappy Concomitant of various other evil Councils, in being permitted. This has been much talked of, often canvaſſed, but, as far as I can learn, never thoroughly adjuſted. The previous Queſtion is, whether we ought not to end the War with all imaginable Diſpatch? The next is, whether, as Trade is undoubtedly the Support of the Enemy, and Credit the Support of Trade, we are not prolonging the War by aiding the Enemy's Credit? and whether inſuring their Shipping is not aiding their Credit? There is nothing in Nature ſo demonſtrable as this,

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and which all other Advantages can in no Senſe balance. The firſt ſuppoſed Advantage is, that we got Money by it, or, in other Words, participated with the *French* in their Profits of Trade: But admitting this to be true, it in no Senſe counterpoiſes the Sums ſpent to carry on a War, which the thus ſupporting of the *French* Commerce aggravates, ſince with the Ruin of that the War muſt end of Courſe. The ſecond Advantage is, that by inſuring the *French*, we muſt know when they ſail, whereto, and under what Convoy. This is a Soleciſm in common Senſe, to ſuppoſe that the Inſurers will firſt ſign a Policy, next inform of the Voyage, and laſtly, pay the *French* the Loſs. Though it is moſt certainly true, that if our Miniſtry could be preſumed to have ſo much Wit, a few Thouſands ſo employed would ſurely procure good Intelligence. But then they would take the Ships too it is to be hoped, and what then? why to be ſure pay the *French* for their Loſſes, and ſo aid them in trading on. But ſuppoſing this Hint to take Place, it will not help the Argument; for as the Nation may inſure to the full Value, I can neither perceive where the Gain will be, nor how a Peace will be furthered thereby; on the contrary, if Trade be the Support of the Enemy, a War muſt be hereby perpetuated, on the Credit of our own Bottom, and we ſhall go on ſpending ſeven Millions a Year on the one Side, while we are uſing our Dexterity on the other, by putting the Enemy into a Condition to ſupport it on their Part. The third and laſt Pretence for Inſurance is, that if we do not do it Foreigners will. It may be ſo; but if we are attentive, not long, as the Loſſes muſt fall too thick and heavy upon them. But admit that not to be the Caſe, what we then captured would be clear Gain, which, if inſured fully here, muſt be a Loſs to the Nation. We talked of gaining Intelligence in the ſecond Caſe, but here, I am afraid, that it will be againſt

againſt us, and thoſe ready to inform the Enemy, who are wicked enough to contribute to their Support, by joining with them to carry on their Commerce. I ſhall make but one Remark more. I take it for granted, that the Ruin of their Commerce will naturally produce an Annihilation, by Degrees, of their Naval Power, and conſequently render our own Commerce more ſafe, extenſive, and flouriſhing, and, what I think plainly follows, leſſen our Inſurance from ten or fifteen to five or ſix *per Cent.* This all connects with the main Argument, and as to the Extenſion of our Commerce, is thus plainly ſhewn.

There are but two Capital Traders in the Sugar Way, the *French* and *Engliſh*, who are Competitors for all the Markets in *Europe*, excepting what are ſerved from *Surinam* and the *Braſils*. So long as this Competition continues, by the endeavouring to underſell each other, the Markets muſt naturally run low, as well as be divided; but if the *French* Sugar Trade be ruined, all the Markets muſt devolve to us, and at the ſame Time be improved in their Value. It is ſaid that the *French* had, at the Beginning of the War, eight Hundred Ships in the Sugar Trade, which employed at leaſt ſixteen Thouſand Seamen, and more Manufacturers and Mechanics of various Denominations; by which Trade, if they only gained the Support of thirty-two Thouſand Seamen and Labourers, at one Shilling a Head a Day, it will amount to 5,84,000 Pounds *Sterling* a Year. And this muſt either be cleared, or the Trade cannot be carried on; and it muſt be obſerved, that this is without any Profit to the Trader, which being added, amounts to a Sum meriting our moſt earneſt Attention, as it regards Inſurances on the one Side, and the proſecuting of the Naval War with Vigour on the other. What has been ſaid of the Sugar Trade will, on ſimilar Principles, affect the *North-American* Fiſhery,

Fiſhery, and which together are the main Pillars whereon the Power of *France* is fabricated. This conſidered fairly leads us into a true Light, what Meaſures are moſt proper to reduce a People, whoſe Aim is Univerſal Dominion, and their Attention wholly turned to ſubject and enſlave their Neighbours.

No Man can be inſenſible that we are now in a Situation capable of effecting the ruin of the *French* Sugar Trade, as in part is done by their Fiſhery already. Nor can any reaſoning Man avoid ſeeing that the *French* are puſhing farther on the Commercial Principle, and muſt inevitably carry their Point if they are able to conquer *Holland*, if they ſucceed in that before we have ruined their general Trade. On their being poſſeſſed of *Holland*, the whole Syſtem of Affairs will take quite a new Turn, either the Lovers of Liberty will drown their Country and retire hither; or if the *French* Party be more prevalent, the *French* will come into Poſſeſſion of that rich Maritime Country, and therewith acquire an Addition to their Sugar Trade by having *Surinam*, and its highly probable the whole *Eaſt-Indies*.

If the firſt be the Caſe, and the *Dutch* do drown and leave their Country, the Conqueſt will avail the *French* little, as the main Wealth and People muſt be naturally transferred hither, and probably ſtrengthen theſe Iſlands more againſt *France*, than if the *Dutch* continued in their preſent State, as it would bring the Herring Fiſhery to *Scotland*, and the *Eaſt-India* Trade to *London*, and with theſe a Store of Wealth, not to be counterpoiſed by any Acquiſitions the *French* are capable of making on the Continent.

On the contrary, as ſeems moſt probable, if the *French* ſhould ſubdue *Holland*, and the People generally conſent to live under a *French* Government on ſuch fair ſeeming Terms as may be preſcribed them, and we have not previouſly ruined their Naval Power,

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we ſhall with the Loſs of our Naval Frontier be reduced to the ſimple Dilemma of fairly fighting it out under infinite Diſadvantages, or following the Example of our wiſe Allies, tamely ſubmit to be the Slaves of *French* Inſolence.

I am verily perſuaded, that ſomething of this Nature is nearly approaching, whether we continue the War, or agree to a ſhameful Peace; but with this Difference: That if the War is carried on by Sea with Skill and Spirit for two Summers, and *Holland* can be ſo long defended, we may in that Time put ourſelves into a Condition to defy the warmeſt Efforts of *French* Power; but if we make a Peace, and the *French* thereby recover again their Commerce and Naval Strength, one ſingle Summer's Campaign by Land and Sea may ruin the Work of Ages, and render the Power of *France* wholly irreſiſtible. In this I ſee not any rational Alternative, nor can conceive on what Terms it's poſſible to make Peace, but ſuch as muſt be attended with inevitable Ruin.

Our Navy now is juſt coming into that State and Order which adapts it to the purſuit of a vigorous War; we have now Admirals, Captains, and Seamen, that have learned to fight: The Sea open to us, and all the Power in our own Hands: We have ſeen what a deſpicable Figure we made at firſt ſetting out, and all our Poltrons even not yet hanged out of the Way, or diſcharged. A few Years will diſperſe the brave Fellows that now ſubſiſt, and we ſhall return again to our primitive Meanneſs, while the *French* will be planning out our Ruin, taking every Advantage of our Indolence and Corruption, and will lead us on with a malicious Smile the ſmooth Road to Deſtruction. In a word, it may be ſaid in general, as to our Naval Affairs, if Men in Power will but in Earneſt puniſh thoſe Wretches, who in the *Weſt-Indies* and nearer home have made their Country a mere ſtalking Horſe, and that hold Courage and Honour

nour in Contempt, it is not in the leaſt to be feared but we may in one Summer's warm Attention to a Naval War, amply repay ourſelves the Expences of the War, as thirty or forty Millions may be ſoon returned to the Nation in the Fiſhery and Sugar Trade; ſince it will be very hard if thoſe Trades, which effectually ſupport the *French* in their Wars, will not in a few Years as effectually clear our Debts. I believe, after what has been ſaid, the Reader can hardly doubt the Succeſs of vigorous Meaſures, nor the obvious Conſequences: But we muſt hope at the ſame Time, that the Nation is to be obliged with the preferring and employing only of ſuch Men as have proved they have the Intereſt of their Country at Heart: Not ſuch as have either run away from the Enemy, or left their Commanders to purſue the Circuit of the Globe alone. There is no need to mention their Names, as an indelible Mark of Infamy is ſtamped on them, which neither Age nor Time can obliterate. To this I think may be added, that I hope the Folly of fitting out three Deck-Ships will be laid aſide, and the Number of Ships, rather than their Magnificence, attended to, and a Sufficiency of ſuch employed in the *Weſt-Indies*, and annually relieved; that ſo we may conſtantly have there Ships fit for Service, our Men preſerved, the Enemy deſtroyed, and our own Trade ſafely convoyed.

I think we have now pretty well travelled through the State of our Naval Affairs, and conſidered incidentally the Nature and Effect of War and Peace; we come next to the State of the Army, with that the Nature of our Contracts and Alliances, and in fine, the whole Syſtem of our Situation on the Continent.

Before we take particular Notice of the Number and Conduct, the Money given for, and the Troops employed, I ſhall take upon me in the firſt Place to give the Reader a clear Idea of the State, Nature and Intereſt of our reſpective Alliances. It has ap-

peared evidently enough on the Part of the King of *Sardinia*, that he has in every Reſpect complied with his Engagements, that he is entitled to the Dominions allotted him by the Treaty of *Wormes*; and has by the Diverſion given the *French* rendered that Nation unable to make ſuch violent Attacks on the Side of *Flanders* as might otherwiſe have been done, or to ſpare any Troops for the Setvice of the Pretender. Thus far our Alliance is very happy, but there is ſomething interferes on this Occaſion, which merits our Attention. We pay a certain Subſidy to the King of *Sardinia*, and vote another to the Court of *Vienna*, and ſtipulate for a certain Number of Men to be brought into the *Low-Countries*, and on the Credit of theſe Stipulations, and the Number of Men voted over by Parliament, we are preſumed to bring into the Field 140,000 Men into *Flanders*; inſtead of which, there has not appeared 90,000, the Difference is 50,000 at leaſt: Upon aſking where are theſe Men ſo paid for, it is anſwered, that the Neceſſity of farther aiding the King of *Sardinia* has drawn them into *Italy*. Whether this be true or falſe matters little, it muſt have been well known what Power the *French* could bring into the *Low-Countries*, and that the *Dutch* were in no Senſe our Friends: If therefore it was neceſſary to further aid the King of *Sardinia*, there is nothing clearer, than that we had infinitely better have doubled that King's Subſidy, than wanted the *Auſtrian* Troops in *Flanders*, as his Majeſty could therewith have had *Swiſs* Troops, better anſwering his good Intention, as his Command of them would have been abſolute. But I am afraid, that the *Auſtrians* are rather purſuing Ends of their own, and making Acquiſitions in *Italy*, at our Expence, than purſuing the main End of the Alliance. And if this be the Caſe, we are perpetuating the War to no Kind of Purpoſe, and, inſtead of beating the *French* into good Manners, are

ſuffering them to gain Ground, where we can only dread them, while our Allies are conquering, what to us is perfectly inſignificant. This is not carrying on the War fairly, it is only making ourſelves the Dupes and Bubbles of thoſe, we have purely undertaken the War to preſerve, and are thereby, inſtead of beating the *French* out of *Flanders*, drove to the only Reſource we have left, of defending *Holland*. It is very true that the *Dutch* do not deſerve our Aid, nor many of the principal Men deſire it, but alas! we have no Alternative. There is an honeſt Party there that we are bound in Honour to protect, and with them, in Effect, our own Frontier. Our Inattention to Maritime Affairs, as has been before obſerved, has not reduced the *French* low enough by Sea to make it indifferent to us what becomes of *Holland*, and therefore ought to have had all the Troops we pay, or agree for, to have prevented the *French* making any Acquiſitions there; ſo that, upon the whole, it matters little to ſay, that they were employed in *Italy*, as their being employed there may be attended with more fatal Conſequences to us, than if the *French* had been poſſeſſed of all *Italy*. Our Buſineſs is certainly to keep the Enemy at a Diſtance, not to pay for bringing them Home to our own Doors. If the King of *Sardinia* wanted more Aid, ſurely he would beſt have had it in Money. This I hope clears up all that vague Reaſoning and Pretence our miniſterial People are ſo fond of in their Juſtification, and ſets us right in a Point of the laſt Importance to our Safety; but leaves us in Doubt what Conſtruction to put on that Conduct, which at once ſacrifices our beſt Men to ſuperior Force, blackens the Reputation of our noble young General, and runs us upon the Brink of Deſtruction.

There is another remarkable Inconvenience has attended the Troops agreed for, not being applied to the proper Service, which is, the not having

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it in our Power to keep any Number at Home for the making Deſcents upon, and alarming the Coaſts of *France*, which might have had a very good Effect, and leſſened conſiderably the Number of the Enemy in the *Low-Countries*, by the Neceſſity of drawing them off to defend their own; and as their Coaſt is ſo extended, muſt have either weakened their Army more in Proportion to the Numbers ſent there, than would have balanced the like Number being ſent into the *Low Countries*, or muſt have put them to equal Expence another Way. But however that might have anſwered, it is at leaſt very obvious, that we ought to have calculated Numbers ſo well, as not to have been merely defenſive in the Field, and by ſeeing the beſt Towns of *Holland* taken before our Faces, ſubmitted to be eſteemed of little Reputation in *Europe*.

The Effects of ſuch Proceedings are to be dreaded more Ways than one. When the Duke of *Marlborough* commanded, the common Soldiers ſignalized themſelves in a diſtinguiſhed Manner, not only as they depended on the Judgment of their General, but as they knew he was always provided with a ſufficient Force to carry any Point, he determined on; and as they found him always ſucceſsful, it ſeems to me evidently to follow, that where the contrary is apparent to them, that is, where they always find themſelves, by Means of their vaſt Inferiority, either led like Beaſts to the Slaughter, or tame Spectators of the Succeſs of an Enemy, whom they in their Hearts deſpiſe, their Courage muſt be naturally damped, and the Men deſirous, in their Hearts, rather to quit all Notions of Honour, and the Service of their Country, than to ſuffer themſelves to be ſo idly abuſed. If any Man in Power is either ſo weak or wicked, as, from particular political Views, to be the Author of ſuch infamous Means, tending at once to murder our brave Men, and ruin his Royal

Highneſs's Reputation with that of the Nation's, ſurely he may be juſtly branded with an indelible Mark of Ignominy, and handed down to Poſterity, as the worſt Kind of Enemy to his Country. It matters not to ſay we are deceived by our Allies, and this Argument uſed Year after Year, till the Enemy, by one Victory more, or perhaps without any, will be in Poſſeſſion of all *Holland*. It is plain that, through Ignorance, Careleſneſs and Corruption, not to ſay worſe, theſe Inconveniencies are brought upon us.

As on the one Side we ſee our Army idly ſacrificed to political and venal Views, ſo on the other, we ſee abroad our Military Governors making a Property of the Nation, and raiſing vaſt Eſtates out of the Blood and Vitals of the People. It would be therefore very proper for the Publick to know what Troops we have at *Anapolis Royal*, how they are cloathed, and how paid. That Government, which is the Barrier of our Northern Colonies, and where the Inhabitants are generally our Enemies; with what Stores that Gariſon is provided, and whether not capable of being taken by five Hundred Men. How this has been paſſed over unnoticed ſo long, is to me perfectly inconceivable; and if thoſe in Power do not know the State and Condition of that Gariſon, and what a Property has been hitherto made of it, they muſt ſoon be further informed by a diſtinct Publication, which I have not Room to inſert here, and which I am ſure the Legiſlature ought to be acquainted with.

The next is, that important Fortreſs *Gibralter*, where arbitrary Power, Venality, and Miſrule, in many Reſpects, outvys *Anapolis Royal*. The Bay of *Gibralter* is full of Fiſh, and the adjacent Coaſt of *Barbary* extremely well ſtored with all Kinds of Proviſions, yet, at *Gibralter*, even an Officer can hardly afford to purchaſe himſelf a freſh Dinner, all Pro-

viſions being ſo exceſſive dear. The Governor is Landlord of all the Houſes, Butcher, Poulterer, Fiſhmonger, Oilman, Wine-Merchant, *&c.* A Veſſel can go to *Tetuan*, or *Tangier*, and return to *Gibralter* freighted with Bullocks, Sheep and Fowl, in forty-eight Hours in moderate Weather, let the Wind blow which Way it will. I have forgot the Price of Beef, but Mutton is about five Farthings a Pound on an Average, and Fowls at about two Pence half-penny. A Veſſel makes a fine Freight of theſe at fifty *per Cent.* Profit, but five Hundred *per Cent.* does not buy them, after being landed at *Gibralter*. Fiſh any Body might catch enough in an Hour to ſerve three or four Families, but that is not permitted; ſo that I need not ſay any Thing of Wines, Oils, Beer, Potatoes, Salt, Fiſh, Butter, *&c. &c.* all is there of a Piece, and in ſhort there is not a Way in Nature, that the meaneſt Mechanic would employ to get Money, that is not uſed here by the Commanding Officer: So that the Gariſon is not indeed ſtarved, but fleeced, and all the Money remitted thither centers in the Purſes of a very few, if not in one only. Formerly it was divided between the real Governor, his Deputy, the Commanding Officer, and Town-Major, but Taxes then nothing near ſo exorbitant as now; and indeed it would puzzle one to learn, by what lawful Authority they dare tax the Inhabitants at all. Herein conſiſts the main Secret, why *Gibralter* is not made a Civil Government, and filled with Merchants, as it would naturally be, and ſupport its own Expences. The Forts without the Town in the Enemy's Hands, perhaps permitted, becauſe it is inconvenient for Ships to ride there long, and ſo fewer Witneſſes to this happy military Conduct. The whole Account whereof, like that of *Anapolis Royal*, being too prolix for the preſent Inſertion, muſt be left to be publiſhed with a general State of the Army; but I hope

enough has been hinted regarding both, to demand a ſtrict Enquiry into a State of the reſpective Gariſons; more eſpecially when Remittances ſhamefully reduce the Soldier's Pay, the allowed Contingencies not applied, and the ſame Gariſon continued, for fear of publick Complaint, ſo many Years together.

Thus we ſee, without regarding other petty Matters, the delicate Situation of our Army Affairs; *Holland*, our *Europeau* Barrier, on the Point of being ſwallowed up; our Troops butchered, through their Inferiority, though we pay for double what we bring in the Field; *Anapolis Royal*, our *American* Frontier, open to the Invaſion of the Enemy; and *Gibralter* made a Property of within, and blockaded by four Hundred Men without; his Royal Highneſs's Reputation at Stake; and the whole Nation ſinking, not under a War, but by the Effect of Negligence, Venality, and Corruption.

Our Money Affairs come next in Place, with which I think it is right to take in the Nature of Taxes, and the Courſe of Smuggling, as the ſame ſtill continues, though not in ſo high a Degree ſince the lowering of the Tea Duty.

The Nature of Taxes, what Kind are equally juſt and beneficial, and which unequal and injurious, has been ſo often demonſtrated to the Public, that it would be idle here to repeat, was it not for the Sake of the Inferences I propoſe to make therefrom. All Taxes laid on the Materials for manufacturing with, on the Manufactures themſelves in the Workman's Hands, or on Commodities in the Merchant's Warehouſe, are in their Natures very different from what is paid by the laſt Retailer, and ſtill more, from what is paid only by the Conſumer. As the Advance Caſh raiſes the Price of the Commodity, through every Hand it paſſes; ſo that a Duty of twenty Shillings may render the Commodity five Shillings dearer to the Conſumer, while it brings in only twenty

Shillings

Shillings to the Revenue, but the Difference would be ¼ more to the Revenue, if the Conſumer paid; and yet he will pay no more than he would have done, if the Manufacturer or Merchant had only paid the Revenue twenty Shillings. I know the Difference is more than ¼ in moſt Caſes, but that is ſufficient to my preſent Purpoſe, and cannot be too often inculcated, for the following Reaſon: The National Debt now is about ſeventy-one Millions. Thus:

| | |
|---|---|
| At *Chriſtmas* laſt, | 62,000,000 |
| Debt ſince created, | 5,000,000 |
| Navy Debt then, | 5,000,000 |
| | 72,000,000 |
| Voted off laſt Seſſions, | 1,000,000 |
| Total remains, | 71,000,000 |

Now as there would have been at leaſt one Fourth more raiſed, if our Taxes had been laid on the Conſumer, our Debt would have been one Fourth leſs, that is to ſay, only fifty-ſix Millions, but if nicely inſpected into, not near that, for Reaſons too prolix to be ſhewn here. In the Light it ſtands, it anſwers the Uſe I would make of it, which is to ſhew, that ſo large a Debt, now accruing, is likely to involve us in deep Perplexities, if we do not recur in Time to that obvious Method of rendering all our Taxes equal, by throwing them on the Conſumer. The ſecret Objection, which is the not employing ſo many Officers, and conſequently the weakening the Hands of the Miniſtry, being of little Import, ſince Neceſſity will ſoon enforce it, or an Annihilation; but while the firſt is an obvious and honeſt Remedy, I fancy no Body will be weak or wicked enough to attempt the laſt.

It is conceived that including the Navy, there will be this Year a farther Debt created of eight Millions, which makes in the whole ſeventy-nine Millions. And as the Intereſt riſes on the latter Debts, ſo on a ſimilar Principle of proceeding there will be every Year a Neceſſity of raiſing more Money than in the preceding, gradually increaſing to nine, ten, or eleven Millions, all which might be either borne or avoided, if, as obſerved before, we were hearty in the purſuit of the War, and Deſtruction of the *French* Commerce. But if this great Point, the only one that can either ſupport the Miniſtry, or preſerve the Nation, is not purſued, and we go on accumulating Debts by Intereſt on the Deficiencies, as well as on the anſwering Duties, it's difficult to ſay where it will End, but moſt probably in an infamous Peace, and conſequently the becoming a Province to *France*.

It's a pity that even the moſt deſperate Neceſſities of the State won't turn the Minds of Miniſterial Men, to the reflecting on the impending Danger, nor ſeek to ſhelter themſelves under the hoſpitable Cover of evident Rectitude, which a due Care and Diſpoſition of the Revenues naturally preſents to them. The Error whereupon all theſe falſe Meaſures hang conſiſts of various Parts: The wrong Bottom whereon Money is raiſed, the injudicious Manner of borrowing it at high Intereſt, or what is equivalent to it, and the Courſe purſued to borrow it on ſuch Terms. This miſtaken Method appears thus. The C——r of the E——r ſignifies to his Agents, that ſo many Millions muſt be borrowed for the Service of the Year. They upon this form a Plan, valuing the Funds conſiderably under the then nominal Price, after which they ſound their Patron, and from thence form a Judgment what Intereſt he expects to give. They then ſet their Engines to work both here and in *Holland*, and ſell Quantities of Stock for Time in the latter Place, ſo as to ſecure to themſelves a certain Profit.

They

They engage beſides as many of their Friends as they can, Abroad and at Home, to give them their Names for certain Sums to be afterwards ſubſcribed in a Liſt, which they aſſure them they ſhall have. By this Means, when their Patron is near ripe for concluding a Bargain, they being all along privy to the Progreſs he makes, and conſequently judges if the Plan is likely to ſucceed or not, the alternative being now in their Power. In Caſe the Plan is not likely to ſucceed, their Friends have the full of what they gave in their Names for, but otherwiſe they are reduced to $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{4}$, or perhaps to nothing at all. This Practice, now ſo generally well known on the *Exchange*, has been purſued more or leſs by theſe Court-Operators for ſome Years paſt. But as this is carried on to the great Prejudice of the run of Subſcribers both at Home and Abroad on the one hand, ſo on the other it is conducted to the great Emolument of the Operators themſelves, ſome ſecret Friends, and the T——y Vultures, who reap therefrom a fine annual Harveſt: As what is ſtruck off from the beneficial Subſcriptions is divided among them, which they immediately diſpoſe of in *Exchange-Alley*, and then divide the Booty. Thus the S——e, the *Dutch*, and their own Countrymen, are regularly plundered, to maintain the Extravagance and Luxury of a few, and is among thoſe high Inſtances of good Management, whereby a War is to be ſupported, and the Nation preſerved from Ruin. *Publick Credit* is the Baſis whereon is built the Welfare of the State; when that is played Tricks with the whole Superſtructure totters, and therefore as that is managed, a M——y is to be judged of or depended upon, which how far it has been the Caſe here, the following Inſtance may fairly elucidate.

In the Time of the Rebellion, when no one will diſpute the Danger publick Credit was in, nor the Neceſſity of ſupporting it, a Subſcription was open-

ed

ed on the Land-Tax at a publick Tavern in the City, when these great Men subscribed pretty largely, in order to make a Figure, and to ingratiate themselves with the M——r, which they took Care at the same Time to dispose of in *Holland* at a considerable Discount. Hence the Publick may see what Kind of Men they are who affect to support their Credit, when on the one Side they aim to appear the Friends of the Nation, while on the other they were thus undervaluing the best Security we have to give. For I think I need not intimate that a more likely Method to have ruined our Credit could not have been contrived, as every intelligent Man must readily perceive. Thus we see that at the most critical Conjuncture what Kind of Friends these M—— Agents are to the Publick, how much less then are we to expect any Thing from them that's good? The general State and Situation of our Affairs has been already shewn in regard to the Navy and Army; the Government of G——*r* and *Anapolis* hinted at, the Nature of our Taxes considered, and traced through their false Courses, and now as if the bad Management of our Finances did not contribute fast enough to our Destruction; we shall next see that all the Rapparees in the Kingdom are associated, and their Villanies connived at, while they rob and plunder with Impunity. These are a set of Gentry well known by the Name of *Smugglers*, whom it's much easier to prosecute and convict, than to get executed. The Use hitherto made of their Crimes, instead of punishing them, has been chiefly to keep the Criminals *in Terrorem* with the Rod of the Law over their Heads, lest they should vote freely. This answers better than Punishment, because by preserving them, the Liberty to plunder keeps them in a right Situation for voting at Elections; so that as their Cue is understood on the one Side, their Privilege is established on the other; and instead of checking this infamous

Practice,

Practice, is a tacit Encouragement, and carries into Idleneſs and Roguery all ſuch as are blinded by preſent Intereſt, and are not capable of the beſt regulated Principles. Men of ordinary Minds are apt enough to commit bad Actions, though with a Halter about their Necks; but how much more ſo, when a Gold Chain is their Reward, and they can boldly ſay, we contemn the Laws, and bid Juſtice Defiance, can be Spies to the Enemy, ſupply them with Arms, and publickly plunder in Bodies with Impunity? When we find this added to all we have ſaid before, there can be no Wonder at our being neceſſitated to beg Peace of an Enemy ſince; they who have no Government that are in a State of Anarchy and Confuſion, that ſacrifice all that's great, good, and juſt, to Folly, Nonſenſe, and Venal Views, are naturally calculated for Slavery, and conſequently wiſh a Peace, only that they may have ſome Chance to acquire thereby the Favour of thoſe whoſe Chains they propoſe one Day to wear.

It was a Maxim among the old *Romans* never to leave an Enemy unconquered, nor to give an Ally the leaſt Cauſe of Suſpicion. This Uniformity of Action ſupported that wiſe State in all its Viciſſitudes and Diſtreſſes, and raiſed it in the Event to that Pinacle of Glory wherein *Auguſtus Cæſar* found it. All the political Arts, the Tricks and Chicanry, conſequent of ſiniſter Views and narrow Thinking, which ſo much poſſeſſes the Breaſts of modern Miniſters, can in no Senſe produce a ſimilar Effect as that ſimple Principle of ſteady Uniformity. That anſwers effectually every Purpoſe of witty Deviſement, never fails of its End, nor ever deceives any Body. This makes a Nation dreaded by its Enemies, and revered by its Allies, and gives it a Figure and Dignity no complicated Arts can render it capable of attaining. The *French* ſee this and purſue it, not ſo ſimply, ſo not with equal Effect as the *Romans*. The *Dutch* have

have purſued a direct contrary Courſe, and, by loſing Sight of the happy Principles of their Forefathers, have brought themſelves into that Danger and Diſtreſs we now ſee them in. The good Genius of *Britain*, in Spight of the Folly and Wantonneſs of her Miniſters, has ſaved us hitherto, though more than once on the Brink of Ruin, by the Aid of ſome few determined Minds, battling againſt idle Treaties and Negotiations, now reviving again, and therefore ſtill muſt be oppoſed. *Uniformity* is Rectitude itſelf, and by a ſteady Adherence, though on but a moderate concerted Plan, is ſuperior to the beſt laid Scheme unſteadily purſued. In a Word, it is the Fountain from whence National Glory, with all her attendant Bleſſings, ſpring, and conſequently has no Relation to, or Connection with vague Meaſures, which ever embarraſs Regularity, and turn Harmony into Diſcord: Therefore a Stranger to ſuch Expedients, as leave our Politics looſe and unſettled, and which, on the conſtituting a Peace, involves us in perpetual Wars.

In the Time of our *Edward the Third* Uniformity of Action appeared in it's full Spirit and Splendor, this at once animated our Councils, and gave Vigour to our Arms. The ſame Prince that headed the Army, ruled in the Cabinet: Nor has there been a Sovereign, from the Time of this *Edward* to that of *Elizabeth* of immortal Memory, but what looked on the Court of *France* as their Enemy, and always ſo treated it. After which a long Interval furniſhes us at once with different Politicks, and leſs glorious Monarchs, till *William* III. like another good Angel, appeared to redeem our paſt Follies, to recover our loſt Commerce, and to inſpire us with a juſt Senſe of the imminent Danger attending us, by being in Friendſhip with *France*, who had then, by reciprocal Dealing, a Balance of above a Million annually againſt us. The firſt ſeven Years of *Queen Ann*'s

Reign

Reign brought our Diſputes to a happy Iſſue, and *France* then trembled at the Name of *Britain*, when a Miniſtry, never to be forgotten, raiſed and foſtered by Faction, ſtarted into Power, and, by a ſcandalous and ignominious Peace, laid the Foundation of all the Expence, Troubles, and Perplexities, we have ſince laboured under. This ſubſequently aggravated by narrow Councils, not a little improved our Difficulties, and threw us into that variable State we ſeem now ſo fond of continuing in, by entring on another Peace, which, if carried into Execution, muſt improve the Evil in Proportion, as one Error aggravates another.

In the Purſuits of *France*, as eying Univerſal Monarchy, a ſteady Regard is had to the keeping up a traiterous Faction here, and a Band of Penſioners in *Holland*; the only two Powers whoſe Oppoſition that Crown dreads, and who are able, with Unanimity, to reduce it to what Degree of Contempt they pleaſe. Yet ſhould *France*, by ſuch Conduct, be able to overrun *Holland*, the being poſſeſſed of her Naval Ports and Shipping, the Spirits of the Diſaffected here will naturally exult, and it will then ſoon be ſeen who are in their Hearts the Friends of *France* and the *Pretender*. Thoſe who think to put a Stop to theſe Things, by making a Peace, are purſuing a notorious Soleciſm, as it is evident, that the *Dutch* Penſioners have only loſt their Power by the War, and which they may recover again by a Peace, with the ſingular Advantage of being better guarded for the future againſt the *Orange* Intereſt, and the Potency of the People; the Armies of *France* eaſily introduced, and the whole Power of *Holland* thrown into the Hands of that Crown; which is ſo far from being impracticable, that it is more than probable, ſince the ſame Men, who have already ſacrificed their ſtrongeſt Towns to *France*, will, upon ſimilar Principles, readily enough ſurrender the Reſidue of their Country;

try; which the *Stadtholderſhip* Settlement may not be able to prevent, ſince a *French* Army entring on a ſudden, and ſo many Capital Burghers as muſt ſtill remain in that Intereſt, will be, when lulled aſleep by a flattering Peace, too hard for the *Stadtholder*'s Friends, eſpecially ſhould the Prince dye, and that Dignity be veſted in an Infant, which may eaſily be put out of the Way, and the Government run again in it's old Channel, and then *France* take Poſſeſſion at Pleaſure. This concerns us eſſentially, as the loſing of *Holland* removes our Capital Barrier both by Sea and Land; and at the ſame Time is the Baſis whereon our internal Enemies will conſtruct our Ruin. When *Holland* is gone, we not only loſe a Country, but at the ſame Time erect a Naval Power, equal to our own, facing us at a ſmall Diſtance, and then have but a faint Chance to preſerve our Commerce, if we ſhall be able to defend ourſelves, at Home, our domeſtic Rights and Liberties. While, on the other Hand, we are morally ſure, by a War vigorouſly purſued by Sea, to deſtroy the *French* Commerce; and by barely defending *Holland* with our Troops, at once ſave the Country, and ſupport the *Stadtholder*'s Intereſt; and with that engage a Naval Power in our Service, that will effectually deſtroy the Enemy's Trade, and with that entirely blaſt all the pernicious Schemes of *France*, projected to enſlave *Europe*. It is clear to the meaneſt Underſtanding how low the *French* Naval Power is, the *Dutch* covering the Sea with Privateers, muſt ſtill leſſen it, and our own Naval Power, with great Facility, finiſh it's Deſtruction; and this, with due Attention, may be effected in one Summer.

It is no Paradox to ſay, that Commerce is the Baſis of Dominion, nor is it difficult to conceive that what the *French* loſe, is our Gain. All agree, that the *French* Commerce, before the War, was more extenſive than our own, nor will any one diſpute

that

that it brought them more Wealth. It naturally follows, that ſuch Addition muſt increaſe our Power, and in Proportion leſſen that of *France*. who, by having no Commerce, muſt drop all her deſtructive Projects for want of a pecuniary Support; and conſequently, the deſtroying the *French* Commerce produce ſuch a Peace as we want.

A *Peace* as firm and laſting, as glorious and beneficial; not productive of new Wars, nor making *Peace* and *War* equally expenſive to us; not keeping us always in Terror, and upon our Guard; not fearing Invaſions, nor dreading internal Enemies: But a *Peace* that muſt make the *French* perpetually dependent upon us, that will cure them for ever of ſetting the World in a Flame, and make them as much the Contempt, as they are now the Dread of their Neighbours.

The Miniſtry cannot pretend that we want either Money or Means to effect this. They ſee Money flow in upon them faſter than they want it; the Parliament give every Thing they aſk, and the People's Purſes are open to them. I know where the Shoe pinches very well, and puſh them now upon ſpeaking out if they dare. Our Fleet is ſuch a one as this Nation never ſaw before, it lies upon them to take Care whom they employ, and how they conduct it. If that Fleet cannot make ſuch a Peace as we want in one Summer, I know what ſome People deſerve: The Plan is fairly before them, and Affairs now ſo conſtituted, that it is not Wit and Judgment, but ſimple Honeſty, that is to do all our Buſineſs. The Nation expects it done, they want not a *Peace* by Negotiation, but by Arms; a *Peace* that will execute itſelf, and be perpetual. We want the *French* Trade, it is in our Power, and we inſiſt upon having it; and they who uſe any Arts or Power to prevent it, or do not vigorouſly purſue the Point, are Enemies to their Country, and muſt by ſome

Means or other be treated accordingly, and I hope ſuch Means will not be wanted. Since your Peace-Hunters, by Negotiation, draw a poiſoned Arrow out of a *French* Quiver, and if they pretend, at the ſame Time, that they love their *King* and *Country*, I would only aſk them the following plain Queſtions: Has not the *French King* affronted his *Majeſty* the *King* of *Great Britain*, and the whole Nation, in the Face of the World? Has he not ſufficiently declared his Intention of ſubverting our happy Eſtabliſhment, and of impoſing Popery upon us, by declaring the Pretender our King, and aſſiſted him with Arms, Men, and Money? If this be the Caſe, what Meaſures have we to keep with ſuch a Sovereign? And why ſhould not his Power be levelled as low as poſſible? But if that was not the Caſe,

*Juſtum eſt bellum quibus neceſſarium; & pia Arma, quibus nulla, niſi in Armis, relinquitur ſpes.*

When all that has been ſaid comes to be ſeriouſly conſidered, we ſhall be at no Loſs to gueſs why there is ſuch an abſolute Neceſſity of Miniſterial Attention, towards the ſecuring of C—ys and B——ghs, for the ſpecial Purpoſe of putting Men in, aptly turned, to co-operate in any Meaſures, magiſterially dictated to them. The P———t is the Baſis whereon all our Security reſts; if that ſhould gradually work into a Quick-ſand, the Superſtructure will proportionably ſink and totter: And as the P——t, while ſtanding firm, is the only Check that Miniſters have to fear; ſo is the Art of the Miniſter more eſpecially pointed to the Management of the P———t, which perhaps employs more of his Time and Skill, than all the weighty Affairs of the State put together. Conſequently, on the Eve of a new Parliament, all the brighteſt Faculties of his Mind are turned attentively to that ſingle Object, to procure

cure a Majority of Friends, as being, by their Aid, capacitated to act, as appears beſt to ſuit his Intereſt, and that of ſome few about him. But as to what more immediately regards the *King* and the *Conſtitution*, they are left to be conſidered another Way. After duly reflecting on theſe Remarks, which are, unhappily, but too true, neither what has been previouſly ſaid, nor the Matter, contained in the Subject I am now entring upon, will at all ſurprize the Reader, or leave him at any Loſs to gueſs at the Source of every riſing Evil.

We ſaw not long ſince a Parliament diſſolved before its Time; a Parliament as conformable as could be wiſhed, and without Appearance of Alteration, yet I ſay we ſaw it diſſolved. As this has been the Spring of various vague Conjectures, and no probable Reaſon apparent, it may not be amiſs, before we take Notice of the M——l Conduct in the Management of Elections, to ſhew ſome of the principal Cauſes occaſioning that Diſſolution.

The Reader muſt firſt pleaſe to take Notice, that, at all Events, the Parliament had regularly but one Seſſions more to ſit; that our Affairs Abroad were very critically circumſtanced, by a Revolution of Power in *Holland*, and that a Party of ſome Conſequence were puſhing, with uncommon Vigour, an early Intereſt in their reſpective Neighbourhoods, and this with the Sanction of ſo illuſtrious a Perſonage, as might naturally enough make the miniſterial Party dread the Effects.

The Revolution of Power in *Holland*, the Choice of a Stadtholder, the ſupporting him when choſe, and the eſtabliſhing of himſelf and Succeſſors in that high Station, in Oppoſition to the *French* Intereſt, depended eſſentially on the having ſuch a Parliament here, as would not croſs or confound any Meaſures requiſite to this great End, and conſequently, that ſuch a Parliament ſhould be ſettled for

a Term capable of bringing this important Point to Perfection. Connected herewith is our own particular Situation, the Improvement of our Maritime Affairs, the Augmenting our Land Forces, and the Completing of our Alliances in ſuch Manner, as that the *Engliſh* Party in *Holland* might not only have a preſent but future ſure Dependance on us for their Support; but alſo be able to bring over the Diſengaged, and, either by Reaſon or Terror, cauſe ſome of the *French* Party to fall into the Intereſt of their Country.

They ſaw plainly how this might be obſtructed, if due Regard was not had in Time to Information received in *Holland* of the Progreſs making by the Anti-Miniſterial Party, in whoſe Favour a certain Circumſtance occurred, of a very uncommon Nature, and which getting Time to mature, might have produced an Effect not perhaps in Diſfavour of the Common Cauſe, but that might have procured a Change in the *Britiſh* Miniſtry; and as it could not be certainly known who would ſucceed, the Meaſures taken with thoſe in Power might probably diſconcert all their previous Agreements. The Judicious among the *Dutch* did not doubt, but the Succeſſors of the preſent Miniſtry would have been Men of better Abilities, and equally in their Intereſt; but they were juſtly aware, at the ſame Time, of the invidious Uſe that would have been made of our ſeeming Inconſtancy by thoſe in the *French* Intereſt, and which might have ſtaggered, if not engaged with them, thoſe who had not hitherto joined any Party. As this might have been a great Check to their happy Beginning, and perhaps made the Difference of a Campaign in their Diſfavour; it ſeemed but good Politics in the *Dutch* Patriots, to employ all their Art and Intereſt to ſupport the *Britiſh* Miniſtry, in Oppoſition to that riſing Genius of the Nation, whom, in any other Circumſtances, they would rather have

engaged

engaged with. The uncommon Circumſtances mentioned above, which the *Dutch* dreaded the Effect of at this critical Conjuncture, and our M———y more, was the ſtarting up of an antiquated Right in the Dutchy of *Cornwal.* I need not tell my Readers what a Number of Members that County affords, nor conſequently what Weight their being all of a Side muſt have given to the Anti-Miniſterial Party. There was at this Time produced to Light ſome old Records of the Dutchy, which ſeemed to give a Right to the Prince of *Wales*, as Duke of *Cornwal*, of convening any where, within the Limits of the Dutchy, a Parliament of Tinners, to be continued together ſo long as their Principal, or his Deputy, by his Directions, ſhould think convenient. As moſt of the Heads of Boroughs, and Men of the beſt Intereſt in the County, hold of the Dutchy, are therefore obliged it ſeems to attend this Convention, or forfeit their Eſtates; and as they could have been thereby obliged to vote as directed, all the Members muſt have been neceſſarily choſe, that were Anti-Miniſterial Adherents. This to be ſure, at ſo delicate a Criſis, alarmed the M——y, and put them on uſing their beſt Efforts to obviate ſo important an Oppoſition, as ſuch a Balance againſt them muſt have created. It happened very luckily for them, that theſe Records were not in the Hands or Power of any of the Dutchy Officers; they were in the Hands of an eminent Lawyer, unbiaſſed to either Party, and to whom both made a very arduous Application. While this was in Agitation, and both Sides in doubt which ſhould ſucceed, both the *Dutch* and *Britiſh* M——y were at their Wits End for fear of the Event. They weighed every Circumſtance, canvaſſed every Meaſure, and puzzled and perplexed themſelves to no Purpoſe, Reflection worked on Reflection, Thought on Thought, they looked on one another like Men bewildered in a Storm, expecting

every Moment the finiſhing Guſt, that muſt give them their Quietus, when ſuddenly a Glare of Light appeared from a Quarter they leaſt expected, the Halcyon Day returned, and brightned all their Cares into Joy and Tranſport. They had luckily intimated to the K—g the Neceſſity of learning the Sentiments of the only Man they feared would neceſſarily ſucceed on a Change, now ſeemingly approaching; they waited ſome Time with Terrors enough, when at Length they were told with a gracious Smile, that their Safety purely depended on the Diſſolution of the Parliament.

The Conſequence, in Regard to the Diſſolution, needs not be related; that the Advice was followed, we are all clear in, and it only remains that we ſhew ſome Effects, the natural Reſult thereof. Agents were immediately diſpatched, with proper Credentials, to every venal Borough. Now all Things went on ſwimmingly, and the Anti-Miniſterial Men being caſt in the Court of *Apollo*, the God, attended by Fortune and Riches, travelled with their Adverſaries over the greateſt Part of the *Britiſh* Dominions, and carried all before them; but getting drunk with too much Succeſs, or ſatiated with their too eaſy Conqueſts, they overlooked the Metropolis in their Merriment, and left us Room to introduce a Scene, as extraordinary as memorable.

If my Information does not deceive me, they thought themſelves ſure of the City of *London*, and therefore ſet themſelves down contented with arbitrarily determining who ſhould be the Men. The Liſt they pitched upon were Sir *J*—— *B*——*d*, Sir *R*—— *H*——*e*, Sir *W*——*m C*——*t*, and Sir *R*—— *L*——*ke*. Being now all right, and having got Men to their Mind, that is to ſay, ſuch as they could not exclude, and ſuch elſe as they liked, they left the Affair to take its own Courſe, the Succeſs whereof we ſhall ſee preſently.

There

There was at this Time a Set of Men in the City, who took it into their Heads to form a Scheme for the inveſting the Election of Members of P———t entirely in the Corporation, in the M——r and A———n, excluding thereby all the Merchants and principal Traders; theſe, with their Adherents, who expected one Day to riſe to the ſame Dignity, aſſembled together at the *Half Moon* Tavern in *Cheapſide*, and had from thence the Title of *The Half-Moon Club*; they correſponded regularly with another Set of People, who called themſelves *The Independent Electors of Weſtminſter*, brought their grand Annual Aſſembly into the City, and there aſſociated with them, and drank Healths juſt honeſt enough to ſave them from being hanged. All this paſſed on ſmoothly for ſome Time, and they thought themſelves ſo ſure of their Game, that ſome of their Wiſdoms declared publickly, that both Cities ſhould be ſo governed, and Matters ſo conducted at *Weſtminſter*, that the Miniſtry ſhould be obliged to them for any Law that was to be paſſed for the future; concluding, that when every Thing came to be regulated purſuant to their wiſe Intentions, they ſhould carry an important Influence over the whole Kingdom, as it had formerly done in other ſimilar Caſes.

Theſe Men had a Spy among them of their own Gang, one that had been eternally writing, jangling, and ſcolding for them, an honeſt Miniſterial *Scot*, whoſe Diſtreſſes made him catch at the firſt Offer, and who having been left in the Lurch, by the Broad Bottoms of the Coalition, was now taking his Revenge of the whole Party. Him theſe refined Politicians hugged in their Boſom, and conſulted in all their Schemes, which were at beſt not very deep, and now rendered leſs effectual by the Confidence repoſed in him.

So ſoon as it was rumoured that the Parliament would be diſſolved, this Faction began to form their Councils, and entered into Conſiderations whom to chuſe out of their Body, not dreaming they would be oppoſed by the Miniſtry, much leſs could any of their Fellow-Citizens preſume to meaſure Intereſts with them, but for the preſent agreed only upon their L—d M——r's leaving it to Time and maturer Councils to complete the Liſt.

About the ſame Time, or ſoon after the Diſſolution, there iſſued out of a little Alley in *Whitechappel* a *Man*, well known to the trading World, and often diſtinguiſhed by the City for his Intereſt there, and Conduct in the Management of Elections. His Sagacity pointed out to him at once, though yet in Embrio, the Views of both the Court and City, the firſt he thought incompatible with the Intereſt of the City, and the laſt he ſaw plainly aimed at arbitrary Power, and the Excluſion of the only valuable Men in it. The Civil Principles of the laſt he did not like, and conceived the firſt to have no Principles at all. Under theſe Circumſtances he applied himſelf to the moſt eminent in Trade, and whoſe honeſt Principles, as Lovers of the King and Conſtitution, he was ſufficiently acquainted with; when, after ſome declining and others accepting, at Length two were pitched upon to appear as Candidates, to be put in Nomination when a public Meeting for that Purpoſe ſhould be appointed. But this however kept ſo profound a Secret, that neither the Court, nor City Corporation were apprized thereof Time enough to take any Meaſures to their Injury.

*Saturday*, *June* 13, the Corporation Party had now formed their Liſt, and were not only ſure of Succeſs in their own Minds, that they advertiſed the following Gentlemen to be put up, with an expreſs Prediction

Prediction that they *would be nominated*, and indeed as to two of them there could be but little Doubt. The Liſt was,

The Right Hon. *William Benn*, Eſq; Lord-Mayor,
Sir *John Barnard*,
Sir *Daniel Lambert*,
Sir *Henry Marſhal.*

They recited as Fact in the ſame Advertiſement, that Mr. *Heathcote* declined on Account of his ill State of Health; but there was another Reaſon, which if Mr. *Benn* had equally well conſidered, would have made him decline too, but we ſhall for good Cauſe wave it.

We ſee now, with all this Corporation Aſſurance, that there were hid behind the Curtain two potent Adverſaries. The Court Liſt was expected to come out, but none other ſuſpected, until *June* 19, when the following appeared;

Sir *John Barnard*, Knt.
Sir *Daniel Lambert*, Knt.
*Slingſby Bethell*, Eſq;
*Stephen-Theodore Janſſen*, Eſq;

If any one has ſeen a youg Girl diſappointed of her Huſband the Moment the Prieſt was going to join their Hands, ſo now looked Courtier at Courtier, Corporation Man at Corporation Man. But as theſe laſt, notwithſtanding they ſeemed very ſure of their Point in one Shape or other, ſo they immediately agreed on two Reſolutions, the one to appoint a Meeting at *Grocers-Hall*, the other to form a Variety of Liſts, whereupon ſuch a Number of Candidates appeared, as never before graced a City Election. Theſe were intended to puzzle the Cauſe, and mar

the Merchants Intereſt among the Croud of Claimants; but their Friends turned this into an agreeable Joke, by dragging the moſt obſcure to Light, and ſetting them to face their Brethren. By this Means, making all the Aldermens Liſts appear a Farce, and turning the Citizens Attention more directly on the Merchants Liſt, as the only one ſuppoſed in earneſt.

On the 23d of *June* the reſpective Candidates appeared at *Grocers Hall*, when the Livery, aſſembled there at the eſpecial Appointment of the Corporation Claſs, nominated the Perſons in the Merchants Liſt by a vaſt Majority, and a little indecently, conſidering his then Character, hiſſed the Captain of the Corporation Band off the Huſtings. And the Court Liſt at the ſame Time taken very little Notice of.

There was a Game now to be played between ſuch of the Candidates on the Court Liſt, as did not come in on the Merchants, and one on the Merchants Liſt, who was likewiſe on the Corporation's; and the Buſineſs was, to perſuade this Gentleman to quit his Nomination, and leave the Merchants, in order to carry his Election. How this was effected under Hand, is too delicate a Point for me to relate, as the Author is backed by an Authority I do not chuſe to contend with; he was caught in the palpable Snare, which he did not diſcover, until it was too late to recover himſelf. However I ſhall make this plain Remark, That the ſame Perſon, who underhand put that Gentleman in the Way to loſe his Election, by joining the Corporation, was ſufficiently warned by the Conſequence, when in the like Situation, not to follow his Steps, as will be preſently ſhewn.

The Corporation Party finding their Intereſt of no avail, and ſuppoſing there might be ſome Fatality

tality attending, by reaſon of their Meeting at the *Half Moon* Tavern, and, on the other Side, ſuppoſing ſomething naturally auſpicious at the *Crown* Tavern, where the Merchants aſſembled: As Men, diſtreſſed or baffled, uſually grow ſuperſtitious, they therefore unanimouſly agreed to meet next at the *Crown*, which they did accordingly; but not happening to prove in Spirits, they parted again, without coming to any other Reſolution, than that of ſupporting thoſe Aldermen as ſhould appear to have the moſt Hands in the Common-Hall.

The Court Liſt, like the others, had but three contending Candidates, as Sir *John Barnard* was out of the Queſtion. One of theſe thought himſelf in ſo high Eſteem with his Fellow-Citizens, as he was really a Man of ſome Merit, that he declined being choſe for the County of *Middleſex*, in Expectation of being courted to ſtand for *London*; but that not happening to be the Caſe, he had the hard Fate to miſs both. One of the other Candidates had but little Intereſt of his own, ſo depended on being brought in by the third, who found too much Art neceſſary to get himſelf in, to ſpare any of it in Aid of his Dependant. By this Means the whole Liſt ſeparated: the firſt, as I have obſerved, ſtood on every Liſt, the ſecond took no Care of his Intereſt, the third had juſt enough for himſelf, and the laſt ſhifted as well as he could.

The Court Liſt thus diſpoſed of, the Diſpute now lay between the Intereſt of the Corporation and the Corporation Intereſt, or in other Words, between the *Aldermens* Liſt, when any ſhould be agreed on, and the *Merchants*.

*June* the 30th, 1747, the Election came on at *Guildhall*, when the Aldermen, reſolving, if poſſible, to have none but ſome of their own Body elected, were determined to put up enough of them, and, for that

that Purpoſe, produced the following Liſts, with Sir *John Barnard* at the Head of each of them, *viz.*

| | |
|---|---|
| Sir *Daniel Lambert*, | Sir *Daniel Lambert*, |
| Sir *Henry Marſhal*, | Sir *Henry Marſhal*, |
| *Edward Ironſide.* | Sir *William Calvert.* |

| | |
|---|---|
| Sir *Daniel Lambert*, | Sir *Daniel Lambert*, |
| Sir *William Calvert*, | Sir *William Calvert*, |
| Sir *Robert Ladbrooke.* | *Criſpin Gaſcoigne.* |

*Slingſby Bethel,*
*Stephen-Theodore Janſſen.*

When, from the whole Number, only Sir *William Calvert* was nominated; ſo that he ſtood now in the Place of Sir *Daniel Lambert*, and the reſt remained as at *Grocers-Hall*, and thereupon a Poll was demanded.

If Sir *Daniel* now would have opened his Eyes, his Succeſs was hardly queſtionable: The Merchants would ſtill have given him their Intereſt, which was all any Candidate wanted to carry his Election, but he was reſolved to purſue another Courſe, and conſequently loſt it.

The Queſtion then remaining, was only between the Friends of the new nominated Candidate and thoſe of the Merchants, whether they ſhould join Intereſts. Sir *William*'s Friends propoſed it, and the Merchants deliberated upon it, that is to ſay, Sir *William*'s Friends propoſed to join Intereſts with the Merchants, but to be on both Liſts; but the Merchants had now a potent Adverſary in Sir *Daniel Lambert*, and Sir *William* was ſaid to have ſome ſpecial Engagement with Sir *Robert Ladbrooke*, ſo that in Fact the Terms were not in any Senſe equal; however, as ſome of their Friends were uncommonly

ſtrenuous

ſtrenuous in Favour of Sir *William*, the Merchants complied, at the Riſque of their Elections. This ſhort Account of that Matter will clear up to the Public the Reaſon of the Difference of Numbers that voted for the reſpective Candidates. As the Meſſieurs *Bethel* and *Janſſen* only reſted on one Liſt, while Sir *John Barnard*, and Sir *William Calvert*, were on two Liſts; which I mention, to ſhew that the Merchants were not deficient in their Intereſt, becauſe of their different Appearance of Numbers on the Poll; on the contrary, engaged their Conſorts above a thouſand Votes, and were aided by very few, if any.

To enter into all the Circumſtances of this Affair, would make a little Hiſtory. My Aim, by what has been related, is only to ſhew, that thoſe who thought they had moſt Intereſt in the City found themſelves ſtrangely miſtaken. The M——y could only make one Member, and are obliged to Sir *Daniel*'s Miſtake, and the Merchants Complaiſance, for him. As to the Generality of Elections throughout the Kingdom, the Court doubtleſs owe many to the critical Diſſolution of the laſt Parliament. And if this ſhall prove the Means of preſerving *Holland*, and giving a new Turn to the bad Situation of our Affairs on the Continent, I moſt heartily wiſh them much Joy of the Succeſs of their Meaſures. But if, on the contrary, it ſhould prove the Occaſion of an untimely Peace, I ſhall have quite different Thoughts of the Matter. The City of *London* has always been conſidered of diſtinguiſhed Weight, and I hope will prove ſo in the Houſe by the Value of her Repreſentatives, which have never been equalled in my Memory, as being all Men of Senſe, undevoted to any Party or Faction. If every County, City, and Borough in the Kingdom produced the ſame, we ſhould be very happy, and, I do not doubt, have a very agreeable Concluſion of the preſent War.

I can-

I cannot help obſerving here, on that inconſiſtent Conduct of our M———y, who have been ſo extremely aſſiduous in ſome Places, and ſo negligent in others. The Story of *S———d*, and the Proceedings thereupon, have been too notorious to need being repeated; we have ſeen them baffled in the City of *London*: At *Hull*, a trading Town of ſome Conſequence, they were even at a Loſs for a R———ve, and almoſt any Body might have been in, that thought it worth their while. But they may be excuſed as to their Diligence in this Reſpect, when, as it previouſly appears, the Diſſolution conquered the main Obſtacles, and prevented, at leaſt for the preſent, the Dutchy of *Cornwal* Records from operating to any Effect. As the Difference now appears in the H———e, the Number that Alteration would have produced could have been of little Significance: But here lay the Jutt of the Thing, could that Point have been carried, the Conſequences are not ſo eaſily foreſeen, the Anti-Miniſterial Party would have conſidered themſelves then ſo much nearer the Mark, as to have made it worth their while to have puſhed bolder in others, which, as Matters now ſtand, was hardly worth regarding, and I believe very few thought it worth their while to try their Strength and Intereſt; nay ſome even declined, where they might have been morally ſure of ſucceeding, as conſidering it not worth while to attend, where it was impoſſible to carry any Point of Importance, and therefore would not be preſent, and anſwerable for Meaſures in no Senſe agreeable to them. How far this might be juſtifiable in them is another Queſtion, or whether it was better, at this delicate Conjuncture, to interrupt the Miniſterial Proceedings, is perhaps too nice a Matter for every Body to determine; more eſpecially, as it is very evidently not in their Power to make any Kind of Peace, the Nation could have been

been tolerably ſatisfied with. And as to the Public Money, the Raiſing and Manner of diſpoſing it, may very well lie dormant for a future Enquiry, when the Enemy becomes leſs powerful, and a ſettled Peace leaves us at Leiſure to conſider that Matter more attentively. And if the M——y prove ſo wiſe to themſelves, as well as juſt to the Nation, to fairly beat the *French* out of their Trade, the Advantage will be ſo great, and their Meaſures ſo dignified, that few will think of calling them to an Account for Miſapplication of the Public Money. I am ſure I ſhould be the laſt Man in the World that ſhould dream about it, as I conſider the Balance gained by the War, a ſufficient Counterpoiſe for any Sums that can be pretended to have been ſquandered away. For as I conſider the *French* Trade in general much ſuperior to our own, I ſhall eſteem the Acquiſition of it of much ſuperior Value to all our National Debt, previous or ſubſequent was it increaſed twenty Millions more; ſo that if this happens, thoſe in Power, inſtead of deſerving to be called to an Account, will merit Crowns of Laurel.

Here I cannot help taking Notice of a Point, which all the Great and Learned among the *French* ſeem perfectly to underſtand; they do not lay the Streſs of their Succeſſes, expreſly, on either their Wealth or the Power of their Arms, but, moſt materially, on the uniform and judicious Conduct of thoſe, who have for many Years ſucceſſively directed the Helm, and which, by a Parity of Reaſoning, relates equally to any other Nation, particularly to *Great Britain*.

Mr. *Pavillon*, being early in the Reign of *Louis* XIV. admitted a Member of the Academy of Sciences at *Paris*, in one Part of his Oration makes the following juſt Remarks:

" *Gentle-*

" *Gentlemen*,

" What Difference is there betwixt what our Fa-
" thers have ſeen, and what we ſee at this Day? Our
" Fathers have ſeen *France* begin Alliances in all the
" Courts of *Europe*, to oppoſe only the ſingle Forces
" of *Spain*, and we ſee *France* ſcarce reckoning that
" ancient Enemy among the Powers which Jealouſy
" arms againſt her. They beheld the flaming Va-
" lour of the *French* paſſing impetuouſly their Fron-
" tiers, in order to make uncertain Conqueſts upon
" foreign Countries; we behold the ſame Valour,
" but better conducted, never drawing a Sword, but
" at the ſame Time uniting inſeparably to the Crown
" whole Provinces. They betrayed Councils, and
" ſquandered Treaſures, rendering our Deſigns abor-
" tive; we ſee Order and Secrecy render our Pro-
" jects proſperous and ſucceſsful. Laſtly, they ſaw
" the Shame of Treaties tarniſh the Glory of their
" Arms; and we ſee our Victories ever crowned
" by the Glory of our Treaties. We all know to
" whom we are indebted for this wonderful Change;
" but let not the glorious Condition, in which he has
" placed us, render us ungrateful, we ſhould again
" prove the ſame unhappy People, had we again the
" ſame *Governors*; and, on the other Hand, any
" Nation would have become what we are, if it
" were ſo happy to have a Prince like ours. When
" Fortune from Time to Time has deprived us of
" great Men, has ſhe interrupted the Courſe of our
" Victories? Has ſhe retarded our Enterprizes? or
" rather, Has ſhe not proved, by this Means, that
" the Deſtiny of *France* depends upon the Head that
" governs her?"

The Compliment is here directly paid to the King, but obliquely pointed at that uniform miniſterial Conduct, planned out by Cardinal *Richlieu*, finiſhed

by his Succeſſor *Mazarine*, and regularly purſued by every Miniſter ſince. The Point in View is the Glory of *France*, illuſtrated and dignified by the Honour of the King; the Means hereto, the Acquiſition of Empire; the Route purſued, is by the Way of the *Netherlands* and *Holland*; the final Mark, *Great Britain* and Univerſal Commerce. We ſhall ſee preſently what this has done towards the End aimed at, firſt conſidering, how far a contrary Conduct in her Neighbours has contributed thereto, in Particular, the different Miniſtries in the ſame or in various Reigns, in *Great Britain*, ſince the Reſtoration. *Charles* II. though reſtored in Oppoſition to the Arts of Cardinal *Mazarine*, yet was hardly well ſeated on his Throne, when he fell in with the *French* Intereſts; it is no Matter for what Reaſon, perhaps directly againſt his own Reaſon. His Miniſtry ſold *Dunkirk*, his Parliament not only oppoſed it, but declaimed againſt any Engagements with *France*, argued for the Support of the *Dutch*, yet contrary thereto, the fatal Year 1672 produced, by the Aid of the *Britiſh* Miniſtry, an Event, that was near giving the finiſhing Stroke to *Holland*, and, with it, to the Liberties of *Britain*. The Conduct and uniform Behaviour of the *Dutch* ſtopped ſhort the Progreſs of the *French* Arms, and then our Miniſtry altered their Meaſures, and ſeemed to take Part with the *Dutch*; which, whether in Jeſt or in Earneſt, matters little, the *French* could not carry their Point; and now they begin to think of raiſing a Navy, towards which our wiſe and honeſt Miniſtry contributed all their Power. But as the *French* Navy increaſed, the Power of the *Dutch* became better eſtabliſhed by Land, owing to the Intrepidity of that uncommon young Hero, the then Prince of *Orange*, who not only kept the *Dutch* ſteaddy and reſolved, but became a Check on the *Britiſh* Miniſtry, which all their wicked Councils were not able to elude. The Event we have all the Happi-

neſs

neſs to know; the ſame Man, who ſtopped the Progreſs of the *French* Arms and ſaved *Holland*, checked the *French* Councils in *Britain*, and meritoriouſly became our King, and brought with him that happy Alliance, which at laſt turned the Arms of *France* into her own Boſom. Yet were our Meaſures then very far from being uniform, or perhaps the Diſpute with *France* had ended with ſomething better than a Partition Treaty, calculated by Miſtake to increaſe her Power.

The wiſe Miniſtry that came into Play on his Survivor's aſcending the Throne, with the Aid of the greateſt General of the Age, ſurmounted the Difficulties conſequent of former Errors, and carried their Point ſo far, as to be in Condition to ſecure both us and *Holland* for ever; but the *Dutch* themſelves now began firſt to reliſh the *French* Aurum Potabile, and therefore not ſo much to be depended upon, as when puſhed by the Arms of *France* to the laſt Extremity, and redeemed by their gallant Stadtholder. The Miniſtry changed in *England*, and with them the ſteady Meaſures previouſly purſued. Here *France*, from being reduced by the Power of the Sword to the laſt Gaſp, began again gradually to reſume that Strength, which her uniform Meaſures firſt gave her, which ſupported her under the Affliction of evil Fortune, and which, in the Year 1712, redeemed her from Deſtruction. And here ſhe laid the Foundation of that thriving Commerce, which, in the Year 1740, vied with all *Europe* put together.

Our Miniſterial Conduct, in this Interval, was ſo far from being uniform, as to foreign Affairs, that it was nothing but one continued Change and Perplexity. The Court of *France* ſmiled, and went on in the old Road, on one Side feeding the *Dutch* Rulers with Money, and terrifying the *Britiſh* Miniſtry on the other; which laſt Point was carried ſo far, that I have known the then Miniſter turn

pale at the Name of *France*, which Fear he ſo far inſinuated into all about him, that you may ſee it to this Day imprinted on the Muſcles of his natural Succeſſors. And when we know this the Wonder ceaſes, why, when all the Nation cry out to continue the *War*, yet are they ſo fond of a *Peace*, nay it is become ſo epidemic a Diſtemper, that even thoſe great *Orators*, who formerly railed and bawled againſt ſuch Fear, no ſooner joined the preſent M——y, but inſtantly they began to tell diſmal Tales of the magnific Power of *France*, and deplorable State of *Great-Britain*.

We may eaſily ſee from hence the different Effects of uniform and varying Conduct; we may ſee what it is that carries *France* on ſo pleaſantly to the Goal, and what makes her Neighbours run ſo wide of the Mark; we may ſee by this what *France* is aiming at, and may ſee what *Britain* is coming to. And as this is the grand Point whereon our All depends, whereon every Thing that is dear and valuable to us reſts; our King's Honour, our Country's Safety, and the Peoples Rights; it is neceſſary to enter into indiſputable Proofs. That ſuch Conduct of the *French* has effectually anſwered the End, and that if *England* is in a deplorable State, it is owing to vague Meaſures and bad Heads, and that, at all Events, a ſure and unerring Remedy is ſtill in our Power, when we have Wiſdom and Honeſty enough to be in Earneſt, and apply it.

Before I ſhew what the uniform Conduct of *France* has effected, I ſhall make one general Remark, which is, That when the Diſputes with her Neighbours come to Blows, they always beat her on a Parity, but that what they gain from her by War, ſhe uſually redeems by Treaty. But when *France* brings a ſuperior Army into the Field, and conquers from her Neighbours, ſhe keeps by Treaty what ſhe earns by Conqueſt, generally with an Addition. So

that though *France* be oftenest beat, yet is she in the End the Gainer: Whom she cannot beat, she threatens; and those who scorn her Threats, she buys.

The general State of *France*, and Foundation of her Power, owe its Origin to the levelling of the Nobility, the making of the King absolute, and constituting for his Supporters the *Church* and the *Army*. This being finished, as I said before, under the Ministry of *Mazarine*, there remained but two plain Points to be constantly kept in View; the having of an Army at Home to awe the People, that the Taxes might come in easily, another Abroad to employ the Nobility; and, to support these, a flourishing Commerce. By this, not only all the Power, but, in Effect, all the Wealth of *France* centered in the King, and consequently at the Disposition of the Ministry, whose Interest it naturally must be to find them Employment, and wherein if they succeeded by Conquest, it added to the main Power, by the creating of more Court Dependants. And as the same Army, which governed the raising of Taxes, presided over Religion too, and made all the People think, or seem to think the same, which, after some Disputes with the Inhabitants of the *Cevennes*, became effected; so that there being no more Danger of future Civil Broils, and the whole Power, Civil, Military and Ecclesiastic, settled in the Crown, without Controul or Rivalry, and the Acquisition of more extended Empire necessary to satisfy all Pretenders, and preserve the Peace of the State, it remained only to resolve, that it should be preserved at the Expence of their Neighbours. Why this Point must always be strictly attended to, is apparent from what has been observed; and how it has been attended to, the following authentic Accounts will sufficiently evince, and I hope will amply prove the absolute Necessity we are under of using such Precautions, and pursuing such vigorous Measures, as are necessary,

ſary, at once to defend ourſelves, and to reduce *France* into a Condition, not to be dreaded for the future.

The *French* Court had no ſooner hit upon the Plan of reducing the Nobility and Princes of the Blood to the Condition of private Gentlemen, in every Thing but their Titles, and by that Means eſtabliſhed a laſting internal Peace, but they immediately turned their Heads to the ſetting of *Europe* in a Flame. The *Swedes*, and ſome *Princes* in *Germany*, were engaged againſt the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and *Great-Britain* fell into civil Diſcord, whether by the Arts of the *French* Court, or the natural Fatality of Things, matters not. Here was the Baſis laid of the riſing Glory of *France*; ſince that Time every Year improving; though now and then with political Reſts, to recover the Expence of Blood and Treaſure. During the Wars in *Germany*, and Civil Diſcords in *Britain*, ſhe had only *Spain* to deal with in the *Low-Countries*, for which, in her new State, ſhe proved ſo much too powerful, that even the *Dutch*, the natural Enemies of *Spain*, began now to grow jealous of her Power, which produced the Treaty of *Munſter* 1648. And the ſame Year our *Charles the Firſt* being diveſted of his Throne and Life, and the State of Affairs in *Britain* growing thereupon towards a Settlement, the *French* Court condeſcended to give *Europe* a ſhort Interval of Peace, without taking its Eye off from that engaging Proſpect of making future Acquiſitions, ſince with ſo much Facility effected. From this Time, as the *Dutch* were grown jealous of the *French*, ſo the *French*, on their Part, had in View effectually to remove that Jealouſy, by making the even *United Provinces* their own: But as this muſt be done by paſſing the Dominions of *Spain* firſt, the *Protectorate* of *Britain* was engaged in a War both with *Spain* and *Holland*, and the *French* Court, which had before

ſolemnly renounced any Right to the *Low-Countries*, now entered it with an Army, and by giving *Dunkirk* to *England*, made the greater Part of the *Netherlands* their own, and which, by the Treaty of the *Pyrenees*, 1659, were in a great Meaſure ceded to them. But as Treaties on the *French* Scheme were only made to be broke and giving, merely adding Power to get more; and as ſoon after happened the Reſtoration of *Charles the Second*, and with it, contrary to all reaſonable Expectation, an underhand Alliance with *Britain*, ſo the *French* Court continued purſuing their Point in the *Netherlands*, until they had opened their Way to the Frontiers of *Holland* on one Side; had got Poſſeſſion of moſt Part of *Lorrain* and *Luxemburg* on the other, and ſome Acquiſitions on the Frontiers of *Spain* and *Italy*. "I cannot help here making a ſlight Digreſſion. On the making the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle*, *Killegrew*, *Charles the Second*'s Jeſter, happening to be at the *French* Court, was aſked by *Louis* XIV. whether he had not acquired great Honour by his Arms, and the Succeſs of that Treaty; which *Killegrew* anſwered in *French* Epigram, in *Engliſh* turned thus:

"Luxemburg *you ſeiz'd, by Fraud acquired* Burgundy,
"Lorrain *you ſtole, by G—d you'll pay for it one day.*"

The Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* was made 1668, and thereby the Plan matured, for the Conqueſt of the ſeven *United Provinces*, and Univerſal Monarchy; as that *Britain* muſt have fell next, in the then Situation of its Affairs, is hardly to be doubted, *Charles* a Penſioner of *France*, and the People Slaves to *Charles*. In 1672 the Plan was put in Execution, nor was it in the Power of the *Engliſh* Parliament to perſuade *Charles*

*Charles* of the Danger. A great Part of the ſeven *Provinces* were overrun: But Providence, which overrules the Power of human Politics, here checked the *French* Arms; the Genius of *William* Prince of *Orange* roſe ſuperior; the *French* Emiſſaries and Mercenaries among the *Dutch* were deſtroyed or ſubjected; and the *French* Army at length fairly drove out again, but the Seeds of their Influence left to ſhoot up anew, in due Seaſon.

The Prince of *Orange*'s Gallantry, and the cloſe Attention of the *Engliſh* Parliament, to the Preſervation of *Holland*, as the Bulwark of their own Liberties, brought King *Charles* to think it his Intereſt to ſtop the *French* Career; which, in the Year 1679, by the honeſt Induſtry of Sir *William Temple*, produced the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, which, though it added Acquiſition to the *French* Dominion, loſt *France* the main Point in View, and turned it's Politicks another Way. It's Glory now began to fade, and the Honour of it's Arms to tarniſh. The Empire began to fear it's own Fate, and to form Leagues for the common Defence; into which the *Emperor*, the *Swedes*, and ſeveral *Princes* and *Circles* of the Empire engaged. The *French* nevertheleſs, diſregarding Treaties, as they were beat out of one Part poſſeſſed themſelves of another, and, in 1680, made the whole Diſtrict of *Namur* their own. In 1681 the Duke of *Savoy* put *Caſal* into their Hands, and the ſame Year they overran moſt Part of the *Palatinate*, and ſeized the Town of *Straſburg*. In 1684 the *French* Court ſaw a Cloud riſing on the one Side, and on the other being intent on ſecuring *England* in their Intereſt, by a Prince made for their Purpoſe then mounting the Throne: And in Order to be the better able fully to effectuate their Deſigns, found a breathing Time neceſſary, and therefore propoſed a Truce; which was readily accepted, as both *Holland* and the Empire wanted the like, to accompliſh thoſe

deep laid Views, which ſoon after broke out into Action, and were the Baſis of the future Security of *Europe*. Theſe produced at once a Revolution in *England*, mounted King *William* on the Throne, and formed the firſt Grand Alliance. This was a Stroke upon *France* as fatal as unexpected, and rendered the Year 1688 for ever memorable. The Reſult of this was a regular War, that ended conſiderably to the Diſhonour of *France*, and concluded with the Peace of *Reſwick*, *September*, 1697. By this Treaty moſt of the *French* Acquiſitions on *Spain* and the *Low-Countries* were given up to their proper Sovereign; which perhaps would not have been ſo eaſily conſented to, if the *French* Court, ſeeing themſelves in a loſing Train, had not turned their Thoughts on acquiring them again, with large Addition, another Way. That is to ſay, to have the whole Dominions of *Spain* into the Bargain, having then formed a Plan for making a Prince of *France* King. To attain this Point, King *William* and the *Dutch* were dextrouſly drawn into the famous *Partition* Treaty, which cauſed the Allies to lay down their Arms, divided their Intereſts, and ſeparated *Bavaria* from the *Empire*. The Effect conſequent hereof is ſufficiently within every Man's Knowledge, not to need entring into particularly. It produced a War, which in ſome Meaſure anſwered the Views of the *French* Councils, by placing the Perſon intended on the Throne of *Spain*. On the other Side Part of *Flanders*, &c. returned into the Hands of another Branch of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, and Part became a *Barrier* to the *Dutch*.

From what has happened ſince it will appear unaccountable to Poſterity, how it happens that the ſame People, who ſo glorioufly defended their Country in the Year 1672, and, after having beat the *French* out, ſo ſteadily purſued their Point, and by the Aſſiſtance of *Great Britain* and the Houſe of

*Auſtria*,

*Auſtria*, attained ſo much new Territory as was ceded to them by the Peace of *Utrecht*, ſhould within the Courſe of thirty Years imbibe ſuch different Sentiments of the political State of *Europe*; as on the Appearance of a *French* Army, not only to give up their Barrier tamely, but alſo to betray thoſe very Allies, who firſt procured it for them, and could ſince have ſecured their Defence: And to make it ſtill more ſurprizing, have even uſed Art to ſurrender their native Country into the Hands of *France*.

Here it is neceſſary to remind the Reader as briefly as poſſible, that the ſame Sentiments reigned amongſt a certain Faction of the *Dutch*, even in the Year 1672, or the *French* then had not dared to have entered their Country. *De Witt*'s Maxims, now generally known, were then deeply inſtilled into the principal Burghers. And the true Reaſon of preferring the *French*, to the *Engliſh* Intereſt, founded obviouſly on a certain Knowledge, that they could only become *Tyrants* under the Protection of the *French*, and under that Power eſtabliſh an abſolute Ariſtocracy. This ſettled Principle, though overpowered by the ſuperior Genius of the late King *William*, lay ſtill brooding at their Hearts, carefully nurſed and inculcated among the capital Families, and produced thoſe Effects, which have now brought their Country to the Brink of Deſtruction; and ought to convince us, that until the Stadtholder gets into ample Power, how little the *Dutch* are to be truſted; and it would be happy for *Europe*, if the *Dutch* were alone in bad Meaſures. There are various Means leading to the ſame End; what the *Dutch* Governors have aimed at, by introducing *French* Armies, ſome of thoſe, who have had too much Influence here, ſeem to have had their Eye upon, by endeavouring firſt to ruin our Commerce, and, after having reduced us to Want and Miſery, eſtabliſhed our Conſtitution on a new Model, on that Nonſenſe of the

Landed Intereſt, and a perpetuated Slavery. To this End it is that we are hurried into unneceſſary Debts, improved and aggravated by the loading of Commerce with high Duties, and by neglecting all the natural Channels, by which Money ſhould flow into the public Revenue, and anſwer the utmoſt Exigencies of a War. It is happy for us, that human Judgment is very ſhort-ſighted, and that it is full as probable, ſuch wicked Meaſures will fall on the Heads of the Aggreſſors, as on the People, who have been more than once too hard for the profoundeſt Politicians. In the Courſe we now purſue, it can be but few Years before ſome great Change happens; we ſhall be this Year at leaſt eight Millions in Debt, and in leſs than two more at a Criſis; unleſs retrieved by ſome dextrous Change of Meaſures. We have ſeen, by the brief preceding Hiſtory, what have been for a Century paſt, and what ſtill are, the *French* Views. The Meaſures of the Court of *France* ſtill equally uniform, pointing directly to the ſame End. We know, becauſe every Day's Acts informs us, that ours are deſtroying the very Vitals of our Exiſtence, and cutting ſhort a lingring Conſumption, by giving the Death's Stroke.

It is very remarkable, that there is but one Point between us and *France*, and which ſoever carries it muſt rule; this is, which ſhall have the whole Plantation Trade, whereof Sugars is the principal. The *French* act, on their Part, as Men reaſoning on, and converſant with Commerce; we like Men that make it no Part of our View. They leſſen their Duties as we in Proportion raiſe ours, and ſo in Courſe rob us of the foreign Markets. To counterpoiſe this we have a ſuperior Navy, but are undermining its ſole Support: The *French* Navy is inferior, but they are laying a ſolid Foundation to raiſe and improve it. Our Navy coſts us three Millions a Year, and we ſink one more by raiſing the Duties on Trade; the *French* Navy

Navy hardly one Million, and they gain two Millions by their Trade: So that in Fact there is four Millions difference in our Naval Articles. What we gain by our Navy by taking Prizes, we return to *France* by Inſurances on Intereſt or no Intereſt. So that whatever direct Advances the *Dutch* make towards becoming a Province of *France*, we only vary from them by indirect and oblique Courſes; the Purſuit of both, by different Means, tending to the ſame End. Thus if the *Dutch* become Subjects of *France*, it will be with a good Grace, replete with Trade and Wealth, but whenever that happens to be our Fate, we ſhall ſurrender ourſelves Beggars.

It is true, that I am not at all afraid it will be our Caſe, but conceive that it muſt be a violent Convulſion that can ſave us; and which muſt happen ſuddenly, unleſs a very extraordinary Change in our Meaſures ſucceeds. Our Debt will be ſoon one hundred Millions, which would be a Dream, if every Thing was conducted right; our Naval Power uſing its utmoſt Efforts, an Army able to face the Enemy in the Field, our Trade encouraged, and our Taxes rightly placed; but if neither, or not all of theſe, are arduouſly attended to, the Conſequence is at once plain and evident.

I do not take it to be ſo very material, whether what I conceive to be the Cauſe of our hurrying ſo precipitately into Debt, be the true one, as that the Fact is true, and conſequently has ſome Cauſe; it being out of Diſpute, that, in a four Years War with *Spain* only, a War in itſelf of little Conſequence and needleſsly expenſive, and in a four Years War with both *France* and *Spain*, we have, including Deficiencies, *&c.* ran near thirty Millions in Debt; when in a twenty Years War, from the Revolution to the Peace of *Reſwic*, and from Queen *Ann*'s Acceſſion to the Peace of *Utrecht*, our whole Debt was about fifty Millions. And in this War have conſiderably

ſiderably increaſed our Duties on Trade, which therefore, bad Oeconomy excepted, I take to be the true Cauſe of this enormous increaſing Debt. I ſay nothing of Smuggling, that Bane of Trade, here, becauſe it is the natural Conſequence of loading Commerce with high Duties. Thus, whether the Cauſe aſſigned be the true one, as I ſaid before, the Fact is but too true, and the Remedy very evident.

We are now going to enter on a freſh Campaign, in a Country where the Run of the Powerful are the Friends of *France*; where, under a Notion of having the Aid of their Arms, we may expect to be betrayed; where Burghers Wives, Daughters, and Infants in the Cradle, are Officers, and depute their Book-keepers or Footmen to act for them; where our own Soldiers are diſcouraged, by being overpowered by Numbers; and when our Trade is ſo treated at Home, that we muſt ſoon loſe it's Support. This every Man muſt confeſs is but a melancholy Proſpect.

Our Hopes in the mean Time are centered in the Prince of *Orange*'s getting the better of the *French* Party, and effectually rooting them out of the Army and Government; on the *Ruſſian* Forces coming timely in to our Aid; on our Naval Affairs being purſued with Spirit; and of our bringing ſuch an Army into the Field, as may be able to face the *French*.

How far the Prince of *Orange* may be able to ſucceed, conſidering how much the *Dutch* Army are tainted, may be rather conjectured than aſcertained. When the *Ruſſian* Forces will arrive, as they may be interrupted in their March, Time only can diſcover. How far our Navy is intended to act with Vigour, they only know who are to direct it's Progreſs. And as to the completing of the Army, there are two Things to be conſidered; the Method of acquiring more *Britiſh* Troops, and the being ſure of having

thoſe

thoſe we pay for of the *Auſtrians*. In order to acquire ſufficient for the *Britiſh* Army, it is firſt neceſſary to conſider what idle People we have in the Kingdom, and which Sort of them are moſt proper to ſerve in the Army. Theſe I take to be Labourers, who do not chuſe to work, and Footmen that are not needful. Of either of theſe I ſhall ſay little, not intending here to form Projects; and therefore ſhall only obſerve, that if every Pariſh was obliged by Law, as in Queen *Anne*'s Time, to ſend their idle People, it would perhaps at once recruit the Army, and eaſe the reſpective Pariſhes. As to the Footmen, they have uſually been too well fed, to be readily able to live on common Soldiers Pay; it might be prudent to find them ſuch Officers, as could afford them more out of their own Purſes; which, as the Puſh is greater now, the Conjuncture more delicate than in the Rebellion, would be equally honourable to them; but however this may be, there ſeems an abſolute Neceſſity for bringing, at leaſt, 20,000 more Troops of our own into the Field, and which may be raiſed by a very moderate Degree of Diligence, and the Nation the better, every Way, for their Abſence. But ſuppoſing that due Regard be had to the completing of our Army in *Flanders*, it is neceſſary to conſider, at the ſame Time, how to ſave an Equivalent another Way. It ſeems a determined Point with the *French* to out-number us in *Flanders*, as their main Views all center there, and conſequently, if we increaſe our Power, they will follow the ſame Steps. This muſt be done either by the Aid of their Allies, or by drawing their Forces from the Side of *Italy*. The laſt ſeems moſt probably the Caſe, as the Army kept there is rather intended to defend their own Frontiers, than to invade *Italy*. It will follow, that if Troops enough be left the King of *Sardinia* to balance the *French* Forces, and to defend his own Dominions, and the *Auſtrian* Frontiers

Frontiers on the Side of *Genoa*, the reſt may be withdrawn into the *Low-Countries*.

It may be remembered how we were treated by the Houſe of *Auſtria* in the laſt War, who, inſtead of purſuing the Advantages in their Power, by ravaging the South of *France*, turned their Arms another Way, and, at our Expence, conquered *Naples* and *Sicily* to their own Uſe. This was then the leſs regarded, as we were Conquerors on the Side of *Flanders*, and in *Germany*. But as the Caſe is now very different, it is more our Concern that *Holland* be preſerved, than that the *Auſtrians* take *Genoa*, which they ſeem more to ſet their Hearts upon, than the Benefit of the Common Cauſe. There is now of well appointed Men, at leaſt thirty Thouſand in Arms for the Defence of that State. There will no Body preſume, that leſs than 50,000 are ſufficient to make any Progreſs againſt them acting on the defenſive: On the contrary, if the *Auſtrians* only defend their own Frontiers, twenty Thouſand may be ſufficient, as the *Genoeſe* will hardly care to hazard more of their Troops, if any, for the making of Conqueſts. Conſequently, if the *Auſtrians* can find fifty thouſand Men wherewith to attack *Genoa*, thirty thouſand of them ought to be drawn off into *Flanders*; as it is of infinitely more Importance to us and the *Dutch*, who together pay all, that *Holland* be preſerved, than that *Genoa* be taken, ſuppoſing it in the Power of the Houſe of *Auſtria* to effect, which I really believe it is not, as their Proceedings hitherto have ſufficiently evinced; they having neither Artillery, nor other proper Means, to proſecute the Siege of a Town, where by the Addition of new Works, and a ſtrong reinforced Gariſon, they are in a much better State of Defence than before: So that I cannot help looking upon all Motions that Way as a Scheme to perpetuate the War, by draining us of our Wealth, and enriching

with it an Ally, who ſeems not to have the Common Cauſe cordially at Heart, at leaſt more ſpecially their own particular Intereſt in View. But as we cannot afford this, ſo ought we not to ſuffer any Scheme to be purſued, repugnant to, or interfering with the main End for which this War was entered into; the Defence of the *Low-Countries* and *Italy*, and the Improvement of our own Commerce, by the Ruin of that of *France*. This muſt fix our Eyes, and direct our Meaſures, or a ſhort War, and honourable Peace, can with no Reaſon be expected. We are not, in this dangerous Conjuncture, to conſider what will beſt ſuit the Views of our Allies; it is ſufficient that we find them Money, and thereby enable them to defend themſelves againſt the growing Power of the common Enemy; but it is in no Senſe neceſſary, that they ſhould grow rich, or acquire Dominion at our Expence, eſpecially when the Enemy is in our own Boſom. In a Word, our chief Strength by Land ſhould be drawn into the *Low-Countries*, and if with them *Holland* can only be defended two Summers, there is nothing more obvious, than that the *French* may be glad to quit all their Conqueſts, and be the firſt to ſue for a Peace.

This will appear very evident, when the following Conſiderations are duly attended to. In the firſt Place, as it is agreed between us and *Holland*, that the *French* Commerce ſhall not be any longer ſupported by Inſurances, which have hitherto kept up their Credit, and enabled them to trade. In the next Place, as there will be a large Augmentation to our Naval Power by what the *Dutch* are to fit out this next Year, and conſidering that the *French* Navy by our late Captures is reduced too low to be ſignificantly recruited, or to make any Figure for the future at Sea. There is no one hardly ſo ignorant of Foreign Affairs, but muſt know that the *Dutch* can now fit out alone and man a better Fleet than the *French*

and

and *Spaniards* together; nor can be inſenſible, that the great Trade carried on by the *French* is a ſufficient Inducement to the fitting out of Privateers. This gives us the faireſt Proſpect imaginable of entirely ruining the *French* Trade, which would be moſt certainly effected, if a proper Method was fallen into here of encouraging the fitting out of more Privateers, which might be ſo managed as that they might be on different Occaſions of Service to the State, and to the Owners. For as the *French* Convoys are uſually too ſtrong for the Privateers, ſo on the other Side would two or three of them be of great Service in ſtrengthening ſuch Squadrons of Men of War as cruize for the Enemy, and that rather want Numbers than Force. This appeared in both the late happy Rencounters with the *French* when we took many of their Men of War, but for want of a Number of ſmaller Cruizers loſt the greateſt Part of the Merchant Ships. This ſhews us at the ſame Time the Means whereby the *French* Trade may be effectually deſtroyed, and the Reaſon of uſing ſuch Means. There would, I doubt not, be many more Privateers fitted out if the Hazard was not too great for the Generality of People, and that there is no regular Eſtabliſhment whereby private Ships may cruize with the Men of War. If it is worth while for private Men to adventure, it is much more for the Publick to engage ſo far as to the furniſhing the Shipping with Proviſions, and taking for the ſame an adequate Share of the Captures. A Capital of five hundred thouſand Pounds on this Plan would contribute as to Proviſions and warlike Stores, to keep conſtantly at Sea forty or fifty ſtout Privateers, and the Money poſſibly return to the Publick again with ample Intereſt, and anſwer a much better Purpoſe than the ſame Number of ſmall Men of War, as they would coſt the Publick nothing, and more aſſuredly attend their Duty, becauſe their whole Dependance would be on Prizes.

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I would not be underſtood, that the Navy ſhould be any Way leſſened, I am only attempting to ſhew how eaſy it might be improved, on the equal Chance of gaining or loſing five hundred thouſand Pounds.

I wiſh I had room here to plan out a Scheme to this Purpoſe, as I conceive the only fair Chance we have to give an entire new Face to the War, muſt depend at laſt on our Naval Conduct. It is there only the *French* cannot overpower us by Numbers, nor make their Alliances uſeful. I am ſenſible *Holland* muſt be defended, and that there is a Neceſſity of increaſing our Land Forces; but this I conceive will be at beſt but acting on the Defenſive; and conſequently, that unleſs ſomething very ſhining is executed in the Naval Way, the War may be protracted to our utter Deſtruction. For ſo long as the *French* can keep a ſuperior Army in the Field, can hold the rich Provinces in the *Low-Countries*, and continue their Commerce without ſenſible Interruption, ſo long muſt the War continue. We have wiſely begun in putting a ſtop to Inſurances; I hope this Inſtance of publick Wiſdom will be the Mother of many judicious Meaſures. We have hitherto treated the War with Wantonneſs; ſurely at laſt we ſhall be in Earneſt! Now the Affair is become ſo very ſerious, that it is almoſt within the Caſt of a Die what ſhall be our Fate. The making of a Stadtholder in *Holland* amply counterpoiſes all the *French* Acquiſitions. We have a very fair Chance to recover our Loſſes in the *Eaſt-Indies* with Intereſt; the *Newfoundland* and *Cape Briton* Fiſhery is ſecured to us; the Channel of the *Levant* Trade dammed up, and there remains only that we attend cloſely to the Ruin of the Enemy's *Weſt-India* Trade. And as I hope there is no Truth in the Suggeſtion, that we intend to ruin our own firſt, by increaſing the Duty on Sugars; ſo I doubt not to ſee this War happily ended with the entire Deſtruction of the *French* Commerce; which muſt

be done, or as I have ſhewn before, all our Labour is vain, our Debts are much too high to be paid by any other Means in Nature; and as they muſt be higher, there is no Alternative left us, but to have a Peace on our own Terms, or become the Slaves of *France*. A Choice every *Briton* muſt deteſt. In a Word, one of us muſt now fall, which, next under Heaven, is in our own Power to determine, and I doubt not, but we ſhall be honeſt enough to ourſelves to make a happy Election.

Here I ſhall beg Leave, by Way of Concluſion, to make ſome brief Remarks on the Nature of Univerſal Monarchy, whereby perhaps our own Situation may be beſt underſtood, as I intend to imprint on the Minds of my Fellow-Subjects ſome peculiar Maxims, that I hope the preſent Generation, and Poſterity, may be the better for.

*Dominion* is founded on two Principles, *Wealth* and *uniform* Councils. *Wealth* is acquired by Trade, and is the Baſis of Power, but it is uniform Councils that raiſes and finiſhes the Structure. Thus *Great Britain*, by the Spirit and Genius of her People, may grow wealthy, but her Conſtitution is not formed for extended Dominion, as her Councils are in one continued Courſe of Fluctuation. But, on the other Side, while the People are wealthy, and attentive to their Security, they are not to be conquered. The Errors of a Miniſtry are corrected by the Watchfulneſs of the Community. It is good therefore, that Men write often in Defence of the People, to awake an indolent, inſtruct an ignorant, or correct a wicked Miniſtry. Political Writings may ſometimes riſe into Licentiouſneſs, but are always the Barriers of Liberty. And it is better that ſuch Writers are ſometimes licentious, than that a Miniſtry is always ſo. The firſt can only ruffle, the laſt muſt ruin. As *Great Britain* is preſerved, and her Influence ſome-

what augmented by the Spirit of the People; *France* augments her Power by the Uniformity of her Councils, and a Kind of natural Pertinacity or Promptitude to rule in her People. She has, ſtrictly ſpeaking, no Conſtitution at all, and conſequently no Bounds to her internal Power, nor Check in her Purſuit of Dominion: There is nothing to correct in her Frame, nor any Subject intitled to interfere with the Meaſures of the State, which is at full Liberty to extend it's Power to the utmoſt of it's Strength; therefore let *France* have Wealth for it's Baſis, and Dominion will be aſſuredly conſtructed thereon. In Conteſts not effectually purſued ſhe will tire out, and ruin any free State; her Councils are only to be broke through by main Force, there is no treating with her on a Parity. *Pruſſia* is riſing on the ſame Bottom, and the Houſe of *Auſtria* has been ſolely ſupported on the Principles of Uniformity. Every Miniſter in a free State either proceeds on a new Plan, or moves by none at all. If on a new one, the Chain is broke that ſhould hold the State together, and if on none at all, then the Spirit of the People governs. To give Liberty to the Preſs in *France* would be as ridiculous, as to take it away in *England*; where the Subject has no Liberty he has no Right. The King has more at Stake than the People, therefore a Right to govern as he pleaſes, ſo that his Subjects be treated on the fair Principles of Humanity. In a free State every Subject is a Sharer in the Legiſlature, and therefore, when debarred the Freedom of Speech or writing with Decency, is deprived of the only Diſtinction between him and a Slave; from that Moment the whole Syſtem of Government is annihilated, and veſts abſolutely in the Sovereign.

I thought it proper to ſay ſo much, as it is part of the State of the Nation to underſtand our natural

Rights, and to be guarded againſt a Bill in Embrio, projecting to deſtroy them; ſince it matters little that we have ſhewn what particular Affairs are tranſacting, when perhaps one is in Agitation of more Importance to our Welfare than all the reſt put together: It ſignifies nothing who conquers *Holland*, or what becomes of our Commerce, if we are fooliſh enough to loſe ourſelves: But as that I hope will never happen, it is our ſpecial Buſineſs to take Care it never ſhall, and then we have nothing elſe to do but to diligently attend to the balancing the uniform Councils of *France*, by the right Uſe of that auſpicious Power, which the native Spirit and Genius of the People has rendered truly awful to our Enemies. It is our Courage muſt do all, *Treaties* are Tricks upon us, *Phantoms* with *Peace* on their Foreheads, playing before our Eyes to hide from our Sight the Inſtruments of Ruin and Deſolation following in their Rear. We are no Way a Match for *France* but in a War, it has always ruined her, and preſerved us; it ever muſt do ſo, if we purſue it with Vigour. It is not the Genius or Skill of *Frenchmen* that over-match us in Treaties, but the Nature of their Councils, not to be reached with the ſame Facility as ours. They muſt know what is doing, and where and when a Miniſter is puſhed in a free State, while the Miniſter of abſolute Sovereignty holds all the Myſtery and Reſolutions of the State in his own Boſom. If the Prince is under his Influence, as muſt neceſſarily be the Caſe, his Power is uncontrollable, being of Dignity next the Sovereign, while the Miniſter in a free State is at beſt a mere nominal Officer that the Law is a Stranger to, he is only the common Agent made Choice of by the Sovereign, to tranſact between him and the People in ſuch Affairs as concern the publick Welfare. We ſee then by the different Nature of Governments where our Strength lies, and where our Weakneſs; and cannot be deceived in one eſſential Particular,

which is, that when we know we are ſuperior to the Enemy, to purſue that Superiority. This Hint is fairly given us by the Court of *France*, ſuggeſted by common Senſe, and inſinuated by Self-Preſervation. The *French* underſtand their Superiority by Land, and purſue it to the utmoſt Extreme. Their Gentry, who would be otherwiſe idle, and perhaps diſturb the Repoſe of the State, are here employed to their beſt liking. In this Way they love to ſhine, and find it the moſt natural Road to Fortune's Favours. If by this Means they can ſubdue their Neighbours, Commerce will naturally fall into their Hands without the Expence of a Navy, and the Empire of the World in Courſe become their own.

We have a much ſhorter Road to Empire, if we chuſe to purſue it, ſince it matters little who governs within Land, ſo we preſerve the Sea-Coaſts and Commerce, which no Power by Land can diveſt us of, or make uſeful to themſelves, if they are once effectually cut off from trading on their own Bottoms; but Dominion by Sea muſt follow that on the Land, if not timely prevented. This is the Point now ſingly to be attended to. The View of the *French* Court, in the Conqueſt of *Holland*, is, by the Aid of that brave Maritime People, to be Maſters of the Univerſal Commerce. They are prepared for it by the fine Courſe of Trade already in their Hands, which this Acquiſition may ſingly complete. By a Parity of Reaſoning, our Attention ought to be turned at once to the Preſervation of *Holland*, and Ruin of the *French* Commerce. It ſignifies nothing to correct domeſtic Errors, and quarrel with one another about Power, when the Buſineſs before us is, Whether we ſhall be a People. Our *Patriots* have fatally wrangled themſelves into Places, and us into Inattention to the great End of our Preſervation. We have been afraid of the *French*, until they have acquired Power to make

make them feared; yet is our Situation changed for the better, and what an uncommon Puſillanimity prevented us doing, when we might have effected it with Facility, a vertuous Reſolution and Steadineſs in the main Body of the People, has opened to us a fair Track to Glory, when the Difficulty appears almoſt inſurmountable; as it is now ſeen that *Holland* may be eaſily preſerved, and that the whole Circle of the *French* Trade is abſolutely at our Devotion. If thoſe employed by the Public will not own their former Errors, a conſcious Shame will ſurely ſtimulate them on to endeavour Amendment, by putting our Navy into the beſt Condition imaginable for Action, and by giving all poſſible Encouragement to Privateers, which, with what the *Dutch* may contribute thereto, I hope will finiſh the War happily this ſucceeding Summer, and make the *French* Commerce pay all our Debts. As this, and this only, executed with Vivacity and Addreſs, can, in all human Probability, ſave us; ſo I hope I ſhall be excuſed for treating the ſame Subject in ſo many different Shapes, as it is a Point that cannot be too deeply inculcated. Various Manners of Reaſoning hit different Conceptions, and it is our Buſineſs here to ſatisfy all, of the Rectitude of vigorous Meaſures; of the Neceſſity of ſaving *Holland*; the making of the *French* Commerce pay all our Debts; and of the commanding ſuch a ſure, ſolid and laſting *Peace*, as may never, for the future, be in the Power of *France* to evade or prejudice.

*FINIS.*